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Purpose 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate if payouts financed with external capital exists in 
the Nordics, and if they do, to what extent they occur. 
Methodology 
The paper is of a quantitative nature and have a deductive approach. To try to describe the 
investigated phenomenon of a payout gap a binary Probit regression model has been used.   
Theoretical Perspective 
The presented theories aim to give the reader a basic understanding about the foundations 
connected to payout financing, such as capital structure, the theory of signaling and the 
pecking order theory. Furthermore we will have a look at some previous researches in the 
field and present the results of these studies. 
Empirical Foundation 
Our results confirms the notion that there are firms in the Nordic stock market that tend to 
rely on raising funds externally in order to finance their payouts. Furthermore, we have 
shown that debt issuing debt is the most commonly used financing method and that 
dividends prevail over repurchases regarding payout policies. 
Conclusion 
The study shows that the phenomenon of externally financed payouts do exist within the 
Nordic stock market. The primary vehicle to raise capital externally during time of 
insufficient cash flow to meet desired payout levels is issuing of debt, while the primary 
vehicle to return cash to investors is through dividends.  
We have not been able to pinpoint one certain key driver behind the phenomenon. 
However, we can conclude that the firms with a high market to book-ratio, which also 
make dividends to a higher extent are the ones with the highest probability of having a 
payout gap. Meanwhile, the firms with a lot of cash and a positive operating cash flow are 
the ones with a significantly lower probability of having a payout gap. 
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Syfte 
Syftet med denna uppsats är att undersöka förekomsten av externt finansierade 
utbetalningar i Norden, och om sådana existerar, i vilken utsträckning de gör det. 
Metod 
Denna uppsats är av kvantitativ karaktär och har en deduktiv ansats. För att försöka 
beskriva det undersökta fenomenet med payout gap har en binär Probit regressionsmodell 
använts. 
Teori 
De presenterade teorierna syftar till att ge läsaren en förståelse kring grundbegreppen som 
associeras med externt finansierade utbetalningar. Dessa inkluderar kapitalstruktur, 
signalteorin och pecking order-teorin. Vidare presenteras tidigare forskning på området 
samt en redogörelse för resultaten av dessa studier. 
Empiri 
Våra resultat bekräftar uppfattningen om att det finns Nordiska företag som inbringar 
externt kapital för att finansiera utbetalningar. Vidare har vi kunnat visa att upptagning av 
lån är den vanligast förekommande finansieringsmetoden, samt att utdelningar används 
oftare än återköp beträffande utdelningspolicy. 
Slutsats 
Studien visar på att detta fenomen att externt finansiera företagsutbetalningar  även finns på 
den nordiska marknaden. Det primära sättet att finansiera sina utbetalningar är genom lån 
och det vanligaste sättet att distribuera utbetalningarna var genom utdelningar.  Vi har inte 
lyckats hitta en specifik faktor som driver detta beteende. Däremot kan vi slå fast att företag 
med ett högt market-to-book-värde och som gör utdelningar är de företag som har högst 
sannolikhet att ha ett payout gap. Medan företagskaraktäristika så som högt operationellt 
kassaflöde och stor kassa ger en lägre sannolikhet för ett payout gap.   
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1. Introduction 
_____________________________________________________________ 
In this chapter we are giving the reader an introduction to the study. We 
present the background and the purpose of the study as well as the questions 
that are to be answered throughout the study. Moreover, this section 
presents the delimitations of the study, the material used and the disposition 
of the study. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
1.1 Background 
In theory most people agree that the payouts a firm distributes are financed 
through the free cash flows that the business generates, at the very least this 
is said to be true over the long run (Jensen, 1986). Doing the opposite, 
financing payouts through externally raised capital, either by issuing debt or 
by issuing equity, is generally considered uneconomical as well as pointless 
or at the very least inefficient (Miller and Rock, 1985). To clarify exactly 
what that means, payouts in this context is cash transferred from the firms to 
its shareholders and incorporates both dividends and share repurchases. 
External capital in this context is cash raised through the sale, through the 
issuing of new equity or through long term debt raised in the capital 
markets. 
Recent research shows that many firms in the United States are raising 
capital externally in order to finance payouts. Farre-Mensa et al. (2015) 
studied the US publicly traded entities over a series of 23 years and 
concluded that “32 % of aggregate payouts are simultaneously raised by the 
same firms, mainly through debt but also through equity” (Farre-Mensa et 
al., 2015, p. 2). This also takes place within the same year, meaning that the 
firms are lending capital in order to, during the same period, distribute 
payouts to their investors. 
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The intuitive answer to why firms might do this despite its apparent costly 
nature is quite simple and eloquent, the signal effect. This means that a firm 
needs to communicate strength and belief in future growth in times of 
weakness or financial distress. The signal effects can also affect the payout 
decisions of a firm to the extent that a firm makes payouts to please its 
investors who might expect receiving payouts. Thus, a firm might, rather 
than suspending dividends during a weak year, raise capital in order to 
maintain a previously set level of payouts. However, Farre-Mensa et al. 
(2015) concludes that the signal effect alone does not fully explain why 
companies are behaving as they are. (Farre-Mensa et al., 2015) 
Another intuitive explanation to why firms raise capital externally to finance 
their payouts is that firms, while not generating sufficient cash flows to 
finance all their payouts during a given year, could tap cash reserves in 
order to maintain or increase a payout level. This, despite negative cash 
flow from its core business and investment activities. While this explanation 
is true for many firms, there is still a significant amount of firms needing to 
raise capital even after depleting all cash reserves in order to maintain their 
payout level. (Farre-Mensa et al., 2015) 
We found this to be particularly intriguing and think that there is a distinct 
need to investigate whether the same behavior occurs at the Nordic stock 
market and if so, what reasons are to be found to support or explain this 
behavior. 
1.2 Purpose  
The purpose of this paper is to investigate if payouts financed with external 
capital exists within the Nordics, and if they do, to what extent they occur. 
In addition we have investigated possible reasons for firms to consciously 
keep payout levels above what their cash flow allows them to. 
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1.3 Problem and Question Formulation 
While the traditional finance school suggests that payouts are to be financed 
through the free cash flow, a recent study, made by Farre-Mensa et al. 
(2015) analysing the U.S. market, highlights the fact that many firms 
actually tend to fund their payouts through the issuing of debt and equity.  
According to this study, 42 percent of the observed firms finance their 
payouts by either issuing debt or by issuing equity and the tendency of 
financing payouts through externally raised capital do not tend to occur 
occasionally, but are rather persistent over time. (Farre-Mensa et al., 2015) 
Moreover, the study states that externally financed payouts are often 
financed through the issuing of debt and that repurchases has accounted for 
a significantly higher amount of money throughout the observed years than 
payouts made through dividends. Furthermore, the authors state that there 
are some vital incentives for financing payouts through externally raised 
capital, such as controlling the capital structure and to boost the 
performance in earnings per share. (Farre-Mensa et al., 2015) 
Based on what have been stated by Farre-Mensa et al., 2015, we believe that 
there are three main parts we would like to, but also need to, answer in order 
to fulfill the objectives related to the stated purpose; 
i. To what extent and how does Nordic firms raise external capital to 
finance their payouts? 
a. What methods are used to bring in capital (issuing of new 
debt or new equity)? 
b. What methods are used to distribute capital raised by firms to 
shareholders? 
ii. What reasons could the firms have to engage in these activities? 
iii. Are there any company characteristics that can be used to predict the 
probability of a firm having a payout gap and give insight to what 
factors that causes the firms to have or not have a payout gap? 
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1.4 Target Audience 
This research is targeted at financial institutions, financial researchers and 
students studying economics and corporate finance. It aims at giving the 
reader a more profound knowledge when it regards the financing of payouts, 
i.e. the concept of raising capital externally to finance the payouts. In order 
to fully replicate our results a certain degree of econometric knowledge is 
recommended. 
1.5 Delimitations 
Companies listed outside of the Nordics have not been considered in this 
paper. To ensure data consistency and replicability we used a single 
predefined constituent list in Datastream. This list, which was the most 
comprehensive containing only Nordic firms did however not include firms 
listed on Oslo Børs. Thus companies listed there are not included in our 
sample.  
All our observations are limited to the time period 2005 to 2014. All entries 
for companies that were not listed for the full time span has naturally been 
marked N/A until the year following the IPO or delisting respectively. 
When defining net proceeds, money raised from IPOs have not been 
included. 
1.6 Material 
The idea of this paper, to analyze how the companies finance their payouts, 
derives from a Harvard Working Paper; “Financing Payouts”, made by 
Farre-Mensa et al. (2015) and published at the 15th of March 2015, why this 
article is used as both an inspiration as well as a reference throughout the 
paper. In addition to the article Financing Payouts, previous research within 
the relevant area have been considered, such as “Payout policy in the 21st 
century” by Brav et al. (2005) and “Corporate Investment and Stock Market 
Listing: A Puzzle?” by Asker et al. (2015).  
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The paper also refers to the doctrine within the area of corporate finance and 
focuses mainly on the international publications. The publications are 
mainly publications of general character and regards the different concepts 
used during the empirical study, the capital structure and the concept of 
signaling. 
Regarding the empirical study, the study relies on information gathered 
from Thomson Reuters Datastream. For further information regarding the 
material used for the empirical study and how the material have been 
gathered see chapter five, Methodology. 
1.7 Further Disposition 
This paper is divided into three parts, a descriptive part, an analytical part 
and a conclusion. 
In the descriptive part, the paper commences with a brief description of the 
terms used in the empirical study. Thereafter, the theory is presented 
followed by a presentation of the empirical study. The theory consists of a 
presentation of different theories regarding the capital structure and the 
signaling as well as a presentation of the previous research within the, for 
our paper, relevant area. After presenting the theory, our empirical study is 
presented in depth. In this section we describe the methods used with the 
aim to give the reader a better understanding when it regards the empirical 
study and the collection of information. The presentation of the empirical 
study is then followed by the presentation of the results of the study. 
After a profound presentation of the theory and the empirical study, the 
paper proceeds to the analysis, focusing on the questions asked under 
chapter 1.3 of the paper. This section puts the theory and the empirical study 
together and consists of a analysis and discussion based on our own 
thoughts when it regards the result. 
The study is finally wrapped up by a conclusion, which has as its aim to 
summarize what have been stated throughout the paper and give the reader a 
clear picture of the result of the empirical study as well as our discussion.  
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2 Practical Frame of References 
_____________________________________________________________ 
In this chapter we are, briefly, presenting and defining the most important 
terms used throughout the study, with the aim of giving the reader the 
possibility to better understand how to interpret the results of the study. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
2.1 Cash Flow 
There are important differences between a firm’s earnings and cash flow. 
Earnings are an accounting measure of the firm’s performance and include 
non-cash charges but not the cost of capital investment, i.e. earning  do not 
represent real profits and cannot be used to, inter alia, fund new investments 
or pay dividends to shareholders, for these actions a firm needs cash. Thus, 
the amount of cash available to the firm has to be determined, which is done 
by the statement of cash flows. (Berk and DeMarzo, 2014) 
A statement of cash flows summarizes the information deriving from the 
income statement and balance sheet and establishes the amount of cash the 
firm has generated and how that cash has been allocated during a certain 
period of time. The statement of cash flows consists of three sections; the 
operating activity, the investment activity and the financing activity. The 
operating activity consists of the net income from the income statement, 
which have been adjusted by the adding back of all non-cash entries related 
to the firm’s operating activity. The investment activity then lists the cash 
used by the firm for investments, while the financing activity shows the 
flow of cash between the firm and its investors. In addition to the concept of 
cash flow, the concept of the free cash flow is discussed, which is the 
incremental effect of a project on a firm’s available cash. (Berk and 
DeMarzo, 2014) 
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2.2 Dividends and Share Repurchases 
If a firm decides to make payments to its shareholders, it can do so through 
either dividend payments or share repurchases. (Berk and DeMarzo, 2014)  
Dividends are payments made by the firm to its equity holders and 
constitutes a cash outflow for the firm, while dividends generally reduce the 
firm’s retained earnings. It is the board of directors that determines the 
amount of the dividends paid and when the payment will occur. The board 
can also decide that the firm will make a stock split or a stock dividend, i.e. 
decide that the company shall issue additional shares rather than cash to its 
shareholders. (Berk and DeMarzo, 2014) 
In addition to dividends, there is an alternative way to make payments to the 
investors of a firm. A firm can namely make a share repurchase, also called 
a buyback. In these situations, the firm buys shares of its own outstanding 
stock. These shares are generally held in the corporate treasury, and they 
can be resold if the firm needs to raise money in the future. (Berk and 
DeMarzo, 2014) 
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3 Theoretical Frame of References 
_____________________________________________________________ 
In this chapter we are presenting the, for the study, relevant theory and 
when it regards payout policies and the question of how to finance payouts. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
3.1 Capital Structure 
A firm can choose to finance its projects by using equity alone, in that case 
the equity is called unlevered equity. In addition to financing the projects by 
unlevered equity, a firm can raise capital by using both debt and equity. In 
the latter case, the equity part of the capital is called levered equity. 
Miller and Modigliani (1958) have implied that, given perfect capital 
markets, the choice of capital structure does not affect the firm's total value, 
but affects the composition of the capital. The characteristics of a perfect 
capital market includes the lack of arbitrage opportunities, taxes and 
information asymmetries. When financing projects with both debt and 
equity, the risk premium of the levered equity will be higher compared to 
the case in which only unlevered equity is being used. The reason to why 
the risk premium of the levered equity will be higher compared to the case 
in which only unlevered equity is being used is that the risk connected to the 
debt causes an increased risk premium for the levered equity. Moreover, the 
choice of capital structure affects the shareholders since the debt has to be 
repaid before the equity. (Miller and Modigliani, 1958) 
In order to put the theory of leverage in a context with payouts, we will have 
a look at something called a “leveraged recapitalization”. This action 
regards firms whose capital is consisting of solely unlevered equity. In order 
to change its capital structure, the firm raises debt to perform a repurchasing 
of shares. While the shares are being repurchased with the cash raised from 
the debt, the firm’s assets do not change. However, the composure of the 
firm’s liabilities will shift from equity alone to a combination of both debt 
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and equity. This way, the equity part of the capital goes from unlevered to 
levered and thus it is said that the firm has added leverage to its capital 
structure. Given perfect markets as implied by Miller and Modigliani 
(1958), this kind of transaction is non-beneficial when it concerns net 
present value and the firm’s total value, but, as we can see, the capital 
structure changes. (Berk and DeMarzo, 2014) 
However, in reality, markets are considered imperfect. One such 
imperfection is taxes. Using leverage under taxes can actually affect a firm’s 
total value by using an interest tax shield. Since no interest is to be paid 
when using unlevered equity, the taxable amount is the same as the initial 
earnings before interest and taxes paid, also called the EBIT. When using 
leverage, the taxable income will intuitively be lower than for only 
unlevered equity since the interest paid has to be subtracted from the initial 
earnings. The tax shield is applicable up to the point where the interest paid 
is in line with the EBIT. If the interest paid exceeds EBIT there are no 
further tax gains from having high interest on the firm's debt.  Since the 
interest bear no taxation obligation, the total amount that can be paid out to 
the firm’s investors will be higher with leverage. Hence, the amount paid 
out to equity holders is lower with leverage since the interest paid “eats up” 
a part of the taxable earnings. To conclude, the earnings after taxes paid are 
lower with leverage, but in return the firm's total value will increase. (Berk 
and DeMarzo, 2014) 
When the tax shield is taken into account it actually gives an incentive to 
make a leveraged recapitalization. Since the tax shield will be added on to 
the total value of the firm, this will cause a higher value after the leverage 
deriving from the shield. Still, the composition of the capital will be 
changed, and the equity holders will receive less, but all in all, with the debt 
taken into account, the value of the firm increases and creates value for the 
firm's shareholders. (Berk and DeMarzo, 2014) According to Farre-Mensa 
et al. (2015) results on aggregate payout activity, repurchases have been the 
predominant form of payout over dividends from 1997 until 2012, which 
marks the end of the study (Farre-Mensa et al., 2015).  
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Even though leverage can, as we have seen, increase the firm’s total value, 
there is a risk connected to the usage of too much debt, a consequence that 
can make the firm fall into a state of financial distress and if the firm is not 
able to repay its debts it faces the risk of defaulting. Furthermore, since the 
risk is connected to the debt part of the capital, it obviously increases with 
the amount of leverage the firm uses. With this in mind, a firm has to make 
a trade-off decision in their capital structure regarding how much leverage 
to use in order to make benefits from the interest tax shield while, at the 
same time, avoiding the risk of falling into financial distress. Turning into a 
state of financial distress will result in a negative impact on the firm's cash 
flow and thus decrease the value of the firm. (Berk and DeMarzo, 2014) 
Another common implication is the notion that using leverage is a good way 
to increase a firm’s earnings per share. Hence, when using leverage, a 
change in expected earnings becomes more volatile in relation to earnings 
per share and the risk on the earnings increases. If the earnings are higher 
than expected while using leverage, the levered earnings per share will be 
higher than in the case without leverage. Though, the reverse holds for the 
opposite, meaning that if the actual earnings are below the expected 
earnings, earnings per share with unlevered equity will be higher than in the 
case with levered equity. Thus, using leverage to finance payouts in order to 
boost earnings per share can be seen as a somewhat risky strategy. (Berk 
and DeMarzo, 2014) 
3.2 Financing Payouts 
The basic idea behind making payouts relies on a firm’s will to return the 
free cash flow to the investors of the firm. (Grullon et al., 2002; DeAngelo 
et al., 2006) Therefore, a firm in general, when financing its payouts, relies 
on its free cash flow. The free cash flow namely tells, inter alia, whether the 
payouts are motivated by agency or signaling (Farre-Mensa et al., 2015). 
For example, a mature and cash-rich firm distributes payouts while young, 
growing firms do not pay out any capital (Jensen, 1986; Grullon et al., 
2002; DeAngelo et al., 2006). Thus, a firm should make payouts when the 
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internal cash flow of the firm is sufficient enough to fund the payouts (Ross 
et al., 2013). Therefore, it has been stated that the firms that raise capital 
and the firms that make payouts are different firms, who are at different 
stages of their lifecycles and face different growth opportunities (Grullon et 
al., 2002; DeAngelo et al., 2006). To fund payouts even though the cash 
flow is low, is not recommended and is seen as uneconomic and pointless 
(Miller and Rock, 1985). However, some researchers have stated that some 
firms raise external funds to finance large payouts (Denis and Denis, 1993; 
Wruck, 1994) and that some firms simultaneously raise and pay out equity 
(Grullon et al., 2011). 
Miller and Rock (1985) developed a model for dividend policy given 
asymmetric information. What they basically are saying is that you can 
draw a straight line between a firm’s dividend and its operating cash flow, 
given that the investments and external financing remain unchanged. The 
fact that dividends will become larger if the cash flow increases is therefore 
seemingly intuitive. At the same time the dividends should be smaller if the 
cash flow decreases due to a higher amount of external financing. (Miller 
and Rock, 1985) 
Asymmetric information refers to the fact that there is a gap between the 
insiders and the outsiders of the firm when it regards the knowledge about 
the firm's administration and its future. Generally, insiders (e.g. managers) 
have more knowledge about the future paths and plans of the firm than 
outsiders (e.g. investors). Though, under asymmetric information, the 
insiders keep hold of this information to a certain degree compared to full 
information when everybody concerned with the firm is given total insight. 
(Berk and DeMarzo, 2014) 
In addition to Berk and DeMarzo (2014), the theories by Miller and Rock 
(1985) conclude that young and growing firms do have an incentive to keep 
their dividends on a somewhat low level since a firm that keeps its 
dividends on a low level and uses the largest part of the free cash flow for 
investment purposes, reduces its risk-exposure. Thus, these firms do not 
have to go to the capital market in order to raise funds for investments, to 
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the same extent as if they would have paid a higher dividend. Larger and 
more mature firms should reasonably behave a bit differently and pay higher 
dividends. These firms can of course satisfy their needs to invest in projects, 
perform mergers and acquisitions etc. by using the same methods as the 
smaller firms. Hence, larger companies are generally more creditworthy 
than growing firms which will reduce their risk premium if they decide to 
exploit the capital market in order to raise funds. Meanwhile, young and 
growing firms usually have a larger incentive to keep the dividends low and 
finance their expansion from their free cash flow than larger and established 
firms. (Miller and Rock, 1985) 
3.3 Pecking Order Theory 
The pecking order theory implicates that a firm, in the first place, uses its 
retained earnings for financing purposes rather than issuing debt or equity. 
Thereafter, since the equity, if underpriced, is considered more expensive 
than underpriced debt, debt will be chosen beforehand. If the equity on the 
other hand is believed to be overpriced, issuing equity would be preferable. 
In reality though, equity is rarely overpriced due to the negative correlation 
on the stock price that the issuance of equity has. This leads to the 
conclusion that “…the price drop upon announcement may be sufficient to 
deter managers from issuing equity except as a last resort.” (Berk and 
DeMarzo, 2014, p.539). (Berk and DeMarzo, 2014) 
Myers and Majluf (1984) presented a model of the issue-invest decision in 
cases where the managers of a firm have superior information. Among the 
conclusions made by the authors, there are some conclusions that are of 
more importance when it regards this study and the pecking order theory, 
namely; 
i. it is better to issue safe securities than risky securities, 
ii. issuing debt is better than issuing equity when raising capital 
externally and 
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iii. a firm should not make dividends if it requires the firm to sell stock 
or some other risky security in order to recoup the cash. (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984) 
 
In addition to the above mentioned, firms should cut their payouts before 
issuing any securities (Miller and Rock (1985), while payouts consisting of 
dividends should prevail over payouts consisting of repurchases (Brav et al., 
2005). 
3.4 Signalling 
First of all, it should be stated that there are different theories, when it 
regards signaling, theories that can be applied to dividends as well as 
repurchases. (Brav et al., 2005). For example does Bhattacharya (1979) 
mention the signaling theory stating that the signaling cost is the cost of 
external financing. If a firm pays dividends to signal but does not manage to 
signal what it aimed at, then the firm will have to resort to external capital, 
which is costly. In other words, this model states that dividends provide a 
valuable signal since firms make dividends if they expect that they can fund 
the dividends by using their free cash flow. Thus, firms with a negative cash 
flow, which cannot fund their dividend internally, have to raise costly 
external capital to be able to meet their committed dividend level. 
(Bhattacharya, 1979) 
In addition to the theory of Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985) 
state that dividends can be used for signaling purposes. For example, if the 
dividends are increased through times of low earnings, it will utter a lower 
level of investment, where the dividends can be used as a shield to hide 
behind due to asymmetric information. It should be stressed though, that a 
dividend policy using signaling is not sustainable during a longer period of 
time with low earnings, rather counterproductive for the future due to the 
reduction of investment level. Therefore, Miller and Rock conclude that 
“Dividends make sense as signals for the good-news, not the bad-news 
firms.” (Miller and Rock, 1985). The firms referred to as good-news firms 
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can namely afford the cost of signaling despite low earnings in order to 
maintain a front for the market, which the bad-news firms do not. In other 
words, the theory state that the cost of dividends is that good firms shave 
investment to pay the dividend, and it is only the good firms that find it 
valuable enough to do so. (Miller and Rock, 1985) 
In addition to the theories, many researchers mean that dividends can reveal 
information regarding a firm’s prospects as well as constitute a costly signal 
to change market perceptions concerning future earnings prospects. (e.g. 
Bhattacharya, 1979; Miller and Rock, 1985) Miller and Modigliani (1961), 
for example, discuss the dividend policy under uncertainty and state that 
changes in the dividend rate often generates changes in the market price. 
The authors mean that this phenomenon reflects the informational content of 
dividends, meaning that investors can interpret a change in the dividend rate 
for a firm that have adopted a stabilized dividend policy with an established 
and appreciated target payout ratio, as a change in the management's views 
of future profit prospects for the firm. (Miller and Modigliani, 1961) 
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4. Previous Research 
_____________________________________________________________ 
In this chapter we are presenting the, for the study, relevant theory and 
previous research when it regards payout policies and the question of how 
to finance payouts 
_____________________________________________________________ 
4.1 “Payout Policy in the 21st Century” 
In the article Payout Policy in the 21st Century the authors emphasize the 
fact that repurchases have become an important form of payout due to the 
flexibility of repurchases in relation to dividends. The repurchases namely 
“allows managers to alter payout in response to the availability of good 
investment opportunities, to accommodate time-varying attempts to affect 
EPS or stock valuation, to offset stock option dilution, or simply to return 
capital to investors at the appropriate time.” (Brav et al., 2005). (Brav et al., 
2005) 
Furthermore, the authors state that taxes do affect payout policy decisions 
but that it is not a first-order concern, irrespective of whether the dividends 
or repurchases are greatly tax disadvantaged or not. However, the study 
implies that where repurchases results in tax advantages in comparison to 
dividends, the decisions to repurchase instead of making dividends are 
affected. In other words, the study concludes that the tax inefficiency can 
constitute a factor which makes the firms prefer repurchases over dividends. 
Moreover, the study shows that repurchases are equally as attractive as 
dividends to most investors, while payout policies do not seem to be an 
important tool to persuade investors to hold their stock. 
The authors could neither see that the payout policies are used to signal the 
strength of the firm or to signal the ability of the firm to bear the costs of 
external capital if needed, nor to separate a firm from its competitors, as to 
the academic signaling sense, since nothing supported the theory that a firm 
increases its payouts with the aim of separating the firm from its 
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competitors. However, the study indicates that the signaling can affect the 
dividends in the sense that it makes firms hesitant to reduce their dividends, 
since not cutting dividends can separate a good firm from its bad 
competitors. (Brav et al., 2005) 
Finally, the study seems to show that executives employ fairly 
straightforward decision rules based on the prediction of how outsiders and 
stakeholders will react, a result that the authors mean determine the playing 
field for many corporate decisions. (Brav et al., 2005) 
4.2 “Corporate Investment and Stock Market Listing: 
A Puzzle?” 
The authors of this article discuss the decision making when it regards 
weather to choose between investments in order for the firm to grow larger, 
or making payouts to the shareholders. The conclusion states that there has 
to be a balance, deriving from the free cash flow, regarding how to split the 
capital between making investments, or payouts. The findings indicates that 
a lot of managers generally have a pressure on them in order to ensure short-
term results. Thus, they tend to focus on making payouts in order to state the 
firm's well-being by the time, rather than making investments that are 
possibly vital for the firm's future. (Asker et al., 2015) 
As stated earlier, it is more important for young and growing firms to put 
focus on using the free cash flow for investment opportunities rather than to 
make payouts Miller and Rock (1985). This theory holds for the results in 
the study by Asker et al., (2015). The results indicate that smaller private 
firms sometimes over-prioritize their focus on investments due to grand 
future visions. However, public firms tends to, at the same time, show 
tendencies of doing the exact opposite, namely prioritizing payouts deriving 
from the pressure on the managers to show positive results in the short run. 
The public firms therefore focus on payouts that generates levels of 
underinvestment, resulting in scenarios where the firms are missing out on 
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investments with positive net present value since they increase their payouts 
level. (Asker et al., 2015) 
4.3 “Financing Payouts” 
The article by Farre-Mensa et al. (2015) is the first article that 
systematically studies to what extent the American firms finance their 
payouts by raising capital externally. In the article, Farre-Mensa et al. 
(2015) aim at finding out whether the firms make payouts even though they 
do not have a free cash flow sufficient for financing the payouts. 
4.3.1 The Financing of Payouts 
Farre-Mensa et al. (2015) have shown that even though payouts in general 
are funded through free cash flow, firms rely on the capital markets to 
finance their payouts. The researches namely show that a substantial 
fraction of firms, during the same year, both raise and pay out capital, i.e. 
the firms actually make payouts even though they do not have a free cash 
flow sufficient for funding the payouts. The firms that do not have a free 
cash flow sufficient for funding the payouts can namely raise capital by 
either issuing debt or issuing equity, where the issuance of debt is the 
dominant financing source. Moreover, the researchers state that, during the 
years when the capital is the most easy to raise, the firms choose to raise 
capital externally while, during the same period, making payouts. (Farre-
Mensa et al., 2015) 
Moreover, the study shows the opposite to the general idea, i.e. that the 
firms that raise capital and the firms that make payouts are different firms, 
since the study shows that almost 50 percent of the firms subject to the 
study have made payouts while they, during the same year, raise debt or 
equity. The study also shows that the majority of the firms that both make 
payouts and raise capital externally, would not have been able to make the 
payouts without raising the capital. The researchers therefore conclude that 
the result of their study contravenes the literature, which states that payouts 
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are made to return the free cash flow to the investors. (Farre-Mensa et al., 
2015) 
4.3.2 The Reason to Raise Capital Externally to Finance Payouts  
Farre-Mensa et al. (2015) discuss the reasons to why a firm chooses to raise 
capital externally to finance its payouts and presents different theories. 
Firstly, the researchers state that there are different key drivers of financed 
payouts, which depends on the type of payout that is financed and the 
financing source. The authors of the article, inter alia, states that “financed 
payouts allow firms to jointly manage their capital structure and cash 
holdings in a way that cannot be replicated if they rely exclusively either on 
payouts or security issues” (Farre-Mensa et al., (2015). Furthermore, the 
authors conclude that “financed payouts can be the result of a monitoring 
strategy that has firms setting a payout level that they can fund internally 
when investment is routine but that results in simultaneous payouts and 
issues when they want to pursue new projects” (Farre-Mensa et al., 2015, p. 
5). 
In addition to the above mentioned, the authors emphasize the desire of the 
firms to increase the earnings-per-share, which they mean is a significant 
driver of debt-financed repurchases. The researchers namely state that there 
is a general idea that firms that make higher payouts are more profitable. 
However, they also conclude that there is no ground for the statement that 
the signaling considerations is the main reason to why the firms make 
payouts even though they do not have a free cash flow sufficient for 
financing the payout. (Farre-Mensa et al., 2015) 
Furthermore, Farre-Mensa et al. (2015) state that financing payouts through 
the issuing of debt result in leverage increases, while firms may finance 
their payouts through the issuing of debt to manage their capital structure 
and cash holdings in a way that it is hard to do through either payouts or 
through raising debt individually. One of the advantages of making payouts 
while issuing debt is namely that it increases a firm’s leverage without 
increasing its cash holdings or depleting it. In addition the researchers state 
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that firms with high excess leverage are less likely to finance their payouts 
by issuing debt and more likely to finance them by issuing equity. (Farre-
Mensa et al., 2015) 
Another reason to why a firm chooses to raise capital externally to finance 
payouts can derive from the manager’s desire to benefit from the market 
situation and engage in market timing. A firm can benefit from the market 
through two market timing strategies either by issuing shares when the firm 
is overvalued and then pay dividends or by issuing equity when the firm is 
overvalued and then repurchase the shares when the firm is undervalued. 
(Farre-Mensa et al., 2015) 
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5 Methodology  
_____________________________________________________________ 
In the method chapter we are presenting the type of study used in this paper 
along with explanations of the data sample and the data generating process 
used. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
This study will be separated into two parts. During the first part of the 
research, the study aim to investigate whether the observed payout gap 
phenomenon within the U.S. stock market also exists on the Nordic stock 
market. The second part of the research consists of an investigation 
regarding what kind of firm characteristics that contribute to the behavior of 
externally financing payouts. The test is done with a binary regression 
model where the dependent variable is whether the firm had a payout gap or 
not.   
5.1 Quantitative Research Method 
There are two general premises one should consider in the beginning of a 
research; the qualitative approach and the quantitative approach. The choice 
between these two premises is determined by the initial question 
formulation. In qualitative approaches the research consists of 
thoroughgoing interviews that are complemented and analyzed by the 
researchers. The qualitative method is used when only numbers cannot 
explain a phenomenon. The quantitative approach involves gathering of data 
and test it against theories (Bryman and Bell, 2011). A quantitative research 
method is used when phenomena can be explained by statistical analyses 
and when the primary result are numbers. (Lundahl and Skärvad, 1999)  
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether publicly traded firms 
within the Nordics externally finance their payouts and how the 
characteristics of these kinds of firms potentially differ from the firms who 
do not. Therefore, the best-suited research method in this study is 
considered to be a quantitative research. 
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5.2 Deductive Approach 
There are two central theories on how to tackle the chosen problem 
formulation, which are called the inductive and deductive approach. The 
deductive approach refers to the usage of existing theories in order to create 
models and predictions to investigate the chosen phenomenon. An inductive 
approach is the opposite, i.e. you investigate the phenomenon and then draw 
conclusions and general models of the result (Lundahl & Skärvad, 1999). 
Since this paper is inspired by another study on this phenomenon and uses 
that study to create hypotheses about the results, this paper is using a 
deductive approach. The study this paper is based on is lacking some 
theoretical explanations regarding why this phenomenon occurs and 
therefore this paper, in some aspects, have an inductive reasoning and 
conclusion as a complement to the deductive approach.   
This paper is based on a study written by Farre-Mensa et al. (2015). Their 
study has shown a pattern that a large portion of the American public firms 
have financed all or some of their payouts by raising debt and/or issuing 
equity. 
5.2.1 Gathering of data  
The study is based on secondary data collected from a third party database. 
In a quantitative research method, relying on secondary data is the most 
common approach and is a valid approach as long as the collected data is 
considered reliable (Bryman and Bell, 2011). All data that is analyzed in 
this research is retrieved from Thomson Reuters Datastream database. Since 
this is one of the biggest financial databases in the world, it is assumed to be 
reliable. Another good reason for only using Datastream for retrieving data 
is the consistency of definitions of the desired data for all analyzed firms.   
5.2.2 Sample selection 
Since there has been no previous study on this payout gap-phenomenon 
within the Nordic stock market, this paper has focused on listed firms on the 
Nordic Stock Exchanges. The baseline sample consists of publicly traded 
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firms listed on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm, Helsinki, Iceland and 
Copenhagen. All Large, Mid and Small Cap firms that appear in Thomson 
Reuters Datastream are therefore included in this research. Firms listed on 
other Stock Exchanges, such as First North and Aktietorget, are excluded 
from this research. These firms are excluded due to the limitation of 
available data for these firms in the chosen database and the time limitation 
of this research prevents us from manually fetching the desired data for 
these firms.  
In total, the sample consists of 535 unique firms, which is considered a large 
enough sample to study the payout gap-phenomenon. There are a couple of 
firms that got listed during the studied time period. However, these firms 
have been included from the year after they got listed to get as much data as 
possible for the analysis. 
Since all data is collected from Thomson Reuters Datastream, different kind 
of data had different availability. Thus, some of the desired variables had 
limited availability and were only available for some of the firms, for 
example, the “Share Repurchase”-variable, which has a large portion of loss 
of data. In cases where no data were available for a specific firm, but was 
needed for a calculation, that firm was not counted as an observation, which 
means that different analyzes in this study has different number of 
observations. However, the baseline sample is considered large enough, 
which enable subsets to also be large enough to represent the whole 
population. We have included breakdowns of sample sizes, broken down by 
year for every data output, these can be found in the appendix (Table 1, 
Table 2, Table 3B and Table 4). 
5.2.3 Event study time period 
This study covers a period of ten years, while the data derives from the 
years of 2005 to 2014. We chose a ten-year period for the study to ensure a 
large enough dataset to reach as accurate and reasonable conclusions of the 
payout gap-phenomenon as possible.  
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5.3 Reliability 
According to Bryman and Bell (2011) the reliability of a study is the 
measure of how easy the research is to replicate. This means, more 
specifically, that a high reliability means that the outcome of the study 
would turn out exactly the same if someone else conducted the same 
research. In scientific researches, a high reliability is of great importance 
(Bryman and Bell, 2011). In this study, in order to ensure a high reliability, 
only data from trustworthy and highly reputable sources is being used. 
Furthermore, the methods used in the analyzes will be described as 
thoroughly as possible in the remaining parts of this chapter in order to give 
the reader a deep understanding of how the analyzes were conducted in 
order to replicate the exact study with the same firms. Please refer to Table 
Y in the Appendix for a full list of all firms, including their ICIN number 
needed to gather the data from Datastream. 
We have also documented all variables gathered via Datastream. Please 
refer to Table X in the Appendix for all Thomson Reuters Datastream 
variables and their respective codes and descriptions. 
5.4 Validity  
The validity of a research can be interpreted as the legitimacy of the results 
(Bryman and Bell, 2011). The methods used in this research are not widely 
well known since this seems to be a rather newly discovered phenomenon 
(Mensa et al., 2015). Although, most of the methods are used in a Harvard 
Working Paper, which is considered as a trustworthy university and would 
not publish the authors’ findings and methods if they were not valid in an 
academic point of view. As a complement to the methods used in the 
Harvard Working Paper, an own, more extensive, definition of the payout 
gap has been developed and tested in the analysis. The methods used for 
calculating the payout gap and how the sample sets were created will be 
described in detail below to ensure an external validity for the event study 
(Bryman and Bell, 2011).  
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5.5 Defining Payout Gaps 
5.5.1 Payout Gap 
The way to measure the payout gap is rather intuitive. According to Farre-
Mensa et al. (2015), a payout gap is defined as the gap between a firm’s 
payout and its free cash flow. In other words, this will identify firms that, 
ceteris paribus, would not be able to fund their payouts without raising 
external capital simultaneously. Mathematically, the payout gap can be 
defined as: 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡  𝐺𝑎𝑝  (𝑃𝐺!") ≡ min max 𝑇𝑃!" − (𝐹𝐶𝐹!" + 𝐶𝑅!" , 0 ,𝑇𝑃!"}	  	  
Where,  𝑇𝑃!" = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 = 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠!" + 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒  𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒!" 𝐹𝐶𝐹!" = 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒  𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ  𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 = 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ  𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤!" + 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ  𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤!" 𝐶𝑅!" = 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ  𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!" = −min 𝐶𝐶!" , 0  𝐶𝐶!" = 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒  𝑖𝑛  𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 
(Farre-Mensa et al, 2015). The subscript symbols, i and t, are indicators of 
firm i at year t. The variable “Change in cash” is included in the equation to 
take the cash effect of amortization of debt into account, which is not 
covered in either the operating cash flow or the investment cash flow. With 
this definition of payout gap, the payout gap can never be larger than the 
payout itself and if the payout is less than the sum of the free cash flow and 
cash reduction the payout gap will be zero.  
5.5.2 Extended definition of Payout Gap 
With the above definition of payout gap, only the performance of the current 
year is taken into account. To extend the model, the total amount of cash a 
firm has in the current year is also included in the model. In other words, the 
extended model defines a payout gap if the payout gap, defined as above, is 
larger than a firm’s cash reserves. Mathematically, this can be described as: 𝑃𝐺!",!"#!$%!% = max  {𝑃𝐺!" − 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ  𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠!" , 0} 
(1) 
(2) 
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This extended model is developed by us to investigate by which means a 
payout gap possibly is financed with cash generated from earlier year rather 
than funds raised from the capital market.  
5.6 External Financing of Payout 
Even though it is impossible to observe what specific capital the firm uses to 
make their payouts, it is possible to observe how the firms have raised 
external capital over the years. The amount of debt that the firms raised 
during the years as well as if the firms received cash through the issuing of 
equity is retrieved from Datastream. If a payout gap exist it is assumed to be 
fully financed with the debt raised or the equity issued. In this paper, if a 
firm with a payout gap had both raised debt and issued equity during the 
year, the payout is assumed to be financed with the percentage of debt that 
corresponds to the total debt raised divided by the total amount of capital 
raised and the rest by the equity issues. An illustrative example: if a firm 
had a payout gap and during the year had taken a loan of €100 million and 
issued equity worth of €50 million, then the payout is assumed to be 
financed with 66.67 percent debt and 33.33 percent net proceeds from 
equity.  
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(3) 
(4) 
5.7 Payout Gap multiplier  
We created this ratio in order to measure the average size of payouts made 
by firms with a payout gap compared to firms without a payout gap. 
 
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡  𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟 = !"#$"%&'("  !"  !"#$"!%$  !"#$%&'  !"#$  !"  !"#$%  !"#!  !  !"#$%&  !"#    !"!"#$%&'#  !"  !"#$%  !"#!  !  !"#$%&  !"#  !"  !""  !"#$%  !!!"  !"#$!%"&  !"#!  !"  !"#$%&'(%  
 
We have calculated it annually for all of the ten years surveyed in order to 
detect whether there was a relative difference in size on an average firm level in 
addition to the aggregate relative composition of cash returned to investors 
between firms with or without a payout gap. 
5.8 Statistical Methodology 
In the second part of this empirical study, a regression model is developed 
with the aim of explaining how specific firm characteristics may contribute 
to the probability of a firm having a payout gap. In order to investigate this, 
a binary regression model has been developed. 
5.8.1 Binary Regression Model 
A binary choice model is defined as a model where the dependent variable y 
is dichotomous i.e. can only take the value 0 or 1. A binary choice model is 
defined as:  𝑌! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑋!,!!!!! + 𝑢!, 
where 𝑌! ∈ 0,1   
A first attempt to describe this kind of model is with a linear probability 
model. A linear probability model is the simplest binary choice model and 
the coefficients are easy to interpret. The coefficients correspond to the 
marginal effects that describe the change in probability of Y=1 when X 
increases one unit, all else equal. There are two major problems with a 
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(5) 
 
(6) 
 
(7) 
linear probability model though; the first problem is that the standard errors 
and the test statistics will be wrong. The second problem is that the 
predicted probability may be greater than 1 or less than 0 for some extreme 
values of the explanatory variables. (Dougherty, 2011)  
5.8.2 Probit model 
To solve these two major drawbacks of a linear probability model, a Probit 
model will be used instead. First, we define a new variable Z that is a linear 
function of the explanatory variables. This yields the following function: 
𝑍! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑋!,!!!!!  
Instead of assuming that the probability function is linear, we assume that 
the probability function of Z is a sigmoid function between 0 and 1. In a 
Probit model, this sigmoid function is the cumulative standardized normal 
distribution. (Dougherty, 2011)  
This means that the probability of the event occurring for any value of Z is:  𝑝! = 𝐹 𝑍! ,   
where 𝐹~𝑁 0,1  
In this model, OLS cannot be used but instead a Maximum Likelihood 
analysis is used to obtain the estimates of the parameters. The estimated 
parameters cannot directly be interpreted as marginal effects, but by the 
definition of marginal effects being the derivative of the model with respect 
to each Xi, the marginal effects in a Probit model can be calculated:  𝜕𝑝𝜕𝑥! = 𝜕𝐹(𝑍)𝜕𝑋! = 𝑓(𝑍)𝛽! 
This means that the marginal effects of any variable is not constant, it will 
depend on the value of Z. To obtain some kind of summary statistic of the 
marginal effects, one way is to calculate the mean of all explanatory 
variables and then calculate the marginal effects with these values. 
(Dougherty, 2011) 
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(8) 
In a Probit model there is no measure of goodness of fit equivalent with R2 
as in an OLS regression. There are some alternatives to measure the 
goodness of fit in maximum likelihood estimations such as pseudo-R2. 
(Dougherty, 2011) The pseudo-R2 does not have a natural interpretation. 
Therefore, in this paper we will rather investigate the significance of the 
explanatory variables and draw conclusion out of those results than the 
goodness of fit measure. To somewhat try to visualize a goodness-of-fit in 
our model a Hosmer-Lemeshow test will be conducted. The test basically 
divides the subjects into deciles based on predicted probabilities and then 
computes a chi-squared distribution to test the fit of the model (Strathclyde 
University). 
Since the underlying utility function we want to estimate is latent in a Probit 
model, there is no use to test for normality assumption of the residuals. The 
residuals of interest are those of the latent variable and they are by definition 
unobservable.  
5.8.3 Our model 
In this research we have 535 unique firms observed over a ten-year period, 
this gives us a total of 5350 data points structured as panel data. When using 
a binary Probit model in EViews we cannot make use of cross-sectional 
and/or period Fixed Effects and instead we treat it as ordinary cross-
sectional data.  The following linear-log model will be used in the 
regression:  𝑷𝒂𝒚𝒐𝒖𝒕  𝒈𝒂𝒑  𝒆𝒙𝒊𝒔𝒕 =    𝛽! + 𝛽! ln 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥 + 𝛽! ln 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝛽! ln 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡   +𝛽! ln 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡  𝑡𝑜  𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 + 𝛽! ln 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝐶𝐹   +𝛽! ∙ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽! ∙ 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐  ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 + 𝛽! ln 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠   
The variable Payout gap exist is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if 
the firm had a payout gap and 0 otherwise. In this model, we are using our 
own definition of extended payout gap to decide whether a firm has a 
payout gap or not. Only firms that actually made a payout have been 
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included in the data sample since we believe it is more interesting to 
investigate the payout gap behavior on firms that actually make payouts.  
The five explanatory variables; Capex, Cash, Debt, Operating Cash flow 
and Size have all been confirmed by earlier literature (Bansal et al., 2005) to 
have effect on the size of the payout. Therefore it would be interesting to 
analyze how the same variables, among others, contribute to the probability 
of a firm having a payout gap. All variables in the regression, except the 
dependent variable, are retrieved from Datastream. A short description of all 
the explanatory variables used in the model follows in the sections below: 
5.8.3.1 Capex 
Capex is an abbreviation of capital expenditures. A capital expenditure is 
incurred either when a firm buy fixed assets or adding value to existing 
fixed assets (Berk and DeMarzo, 2014). In order to get a more linear 
relation between payout gap and the capex value, the variable has been 
logarithmized in the model. A firm that has high capital expenditures means 
that the firm is investing a lot and therefore, our hypothesis is that the 
probability of payout gap will increase with increasing capex.  
5.8.3.2 Cash  
In this paper, cash is defined as available cash a firm has as well as short-
term investments. Our hypothesis is that the more cash a firm has, the less 
likely is the firm to have a payout gap. In order to get a more linear relation, 
the variable has been logarithmized.  
5.8.3.3 Debt 
The debt variable is defined as the firm’s long-term debt. Earlier research 
have concluded a positive correlation between size of payout and size of 
debt (Farre-Mensa et al., 2015) and therefore we believe that firms who are 
more inclined to raise debt have a higher probability of having a payout gap. 
The size of the debt has been logarithmized to achieve a more linear 
relation.  
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5.8.3.4 Market to book 
Market to book-ratio is a ratio to find a firm’s value by comparing the firm’s 
book value to its market value. The formula is:  
 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡  𝑡𝑜  𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 = !"#$%&  !"#$%!""#  !"#$%    
It attempts to identify under- or overvalued firms. (Berk and DeMarzo, 
2014) Our hypothesis is that firms that are overvalued, i.e. have a high 
market to book value are willing to do payouts even if there is not enough 
cash to keep their high valuation. The hypothesis is that the higher market to 
book value, the higher probability of payout gap. This variable is also 
logarithmized to get a more linear relation. 
5.8.3.5 Operating cash flow 
Operating cash flow represents the cash flow generated by the firm's 
operations. It can somewhat be associated with how profitable a firm is 
(Farre-Mensa et al., 2015). Our hypothesis is that the more cash flow that 
can be generated internally the less likely is the firm to have a payout gap. 
In our model, this value has been logarithmized.   
5.8.3.6 Size  
The size of the firm is defined as the total turnover in this paper. The size of 
the firm has been identified by earlier researchers to have a positive effect 
on the size of the payout, which is intuitively to believe. However, whether 
it increases the probability of a firm having a payout gap is not as 
intuitively, and this variable will be interesting to see if it has a significant 
impact on the probability of payout gap and whether it is positive or 
negative.  
5.8.3.7 Strategic Holdings 
Strategic holdings are defined as the percentage of a firm’s share that is 
owned by institutional players. In order to identify an institutional player, 
Datastream counts all institutional holders that own more than five percent 
of a firm as a strategic holder. The percentage value is then multiplied by 
100 by Datastream in order to get an integer value. Our hypothesis is that 
the higher percentage of institutional owners, the less probability of the firm 
 
(9) 
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having a payout gap since we believe that institutional players want safe 
investments and do not want firm to raise external cash to make payouts.    
5.8.3.8 Dividends 
Dividends have been included to the model to rather test the legitimacy of 
the model. It is intuitively to believe that the higher payout amount, the 
higher probability of a payout gap. Therefore we assume this variable will 
be significant and has a positive marginal effect on the probability of payout 
gap, if we get another result, the models legitimacy should be questioned.   
5.9 Methodology discussion 
The definitions of the investigated phenomenon are not well known and to 
our knowledge, there is only one more paper that also has investigated this 
phenomenon. Therefore, it can be seen as rather naïve to write a paper about 
the phenomenon before it has been generally known and accepted in the 
academic world. However, we believe that this is a real phenomenon and 
that the definition of payout gap is well founded and worth analyzing. 
In addition to the predefined payout gap, we developed our own definition 
of payout gap. There are some drawbacks of this definition that we are 
aware of. The biggest drawback is the timing mismatch between when the 
payout is distributed and the cash available for the firm. In our analysis, the 
cash available for a firm is retrieved the 1st of January each year and payouts 
are probably distributed later on the same year. However we do believe this 
definition gives us rather accurate analysis whether the firm had enough 
excess cash or not anyways.    
The same goes with the assumptions how the payout gap is financed. Since 
the money is not earmarked we cannot see what money that are being 
distributed as payouts. To simplify, we assume that the payout money are 
uniformed distributed in proportion to how much was raised between equity 
issues and debt if the firm had a payout gap. We do believe this is a 
reasonable assumption.   
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In the regression model, only the firms that made payouts have been 
included, this is due to the fact that we do not see any reason to include 
firms that do not make payouts since it may rather distort the results than 
contribute to a more accurate conclusion.  
Since we have a big loss of data points in share repurchase they are assumed 
to be zero when calculating the total payout if there are no data of share 
repurchase for the specific firm. We are aware of that this assumption can 
distort the results by a lot, but the alternative to exclude all firms that we did 
not have data about share repurchase for would give us a total of 258 data 
points instead of 2186 data points. This means the results presented in the 
study could potentially underestimate the number of firms with a payout gap 
and/or their respective size. This also means that the distribution between 
firms preferred mean of transferring cash to investors could also be skewed 
towards dividends. In Sweden it is still generally believed that dividends are 
more common than share repurchase since not that long ago it was illegal 
for Swedish firms to do share repurchases (Aktiespararna, 2013). We have 
extrapolated this assumption to all the Nordic stock markets and assume that 
payout gaps are mainly due to dividends, and therefore made the assumption 
that when there is no data of share repurchase it was equal to zero. 
Another noteworthy limitation of our Probit regression model is the fact that 
its marginal effects are not constant, thus you can only get the marginal 
effect by looking at either individual firms or by looking at the sample 
average or of the explanatory variables. This means that when we calculate 
the probability of a payout gap of an average firm, outliers in the variables 
could potentially skew some or all of the average parameters. However, we 
are very confident that this risk is minimized by looking at the sheer number 
of observations present in all of our statistical models. We can also see that 
a relatively few extreme outliers are present in most of the data sets by 
looking at our observed values, visualized in Statistics 4A-4I and found in 
the Appendix where we have plotted all parameters for all years to illustrate 
this. The main variable of concern is the size of the company. This value is 
not logarithmized in the Probit model and as a consequence has a large 
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variance. This could imply that the mean value of the firm size is not 
representative as the size of an average firm. To ensure the validity of the 
size mean as a representative value of an average firm, the mean value has 
been compared to the median value, which was even larger than the mean 
and therefore the mean is considered a good estimator of an average firm 
size. 
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6 Result 
_____________________________________________________________ 
In this chapter we’re presenting the results of our data study and Probit 
model. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
6.1 Number of Firms with a Payout Gap 
Looking at the data we can see that about 30 percent of the firms within our 
sample had a payout gap during 2014. This figure has varied quite heavily 
over the last decade and, as illustrated in Chart 1A, it peaked at just under 
half of all firms in 2007/08 before taking quite a steep turn downwards 
during the first financial crisis. In practical terms these figures tell us that, 
empirically, raising money to fully or partially finance payouts and, as a 
corollary, creating a payout gap is not an exceptional tactic regardless of its 
purpose. 
Regarding the extended payout gap, we can see a very similar trend 
compared to the regular payout gaps in terms of when firms were sustaining 
them, however the nominal number is lower across the board when it 
regards the extended payout gaps. During its peak this group, i.e. the 
extended payout gap-payers, contained close to a quarter of all companies 
surveyed before retreating down to ten percent last year. This means that 
during the last years firms between a quarter and a tenth of all firms in the 
Nordics have had their payouts at such a level that they would go bankrupt 
without either lowering those levels or gaining external financing to cover 
their extended payout gap. 
Both of the tallies become more prominent when excluding firms that did 
not return any cash to its investors. Chart 1B shows that last year just under 
half of all firms surveyed, providing investors with any form of cash returns, 
were able to do so because they were raising capital within that same fiscal 
year.   
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Chart 1A: Percentage of all firms that have a 
payout gap 
  
Chart 1B: Percentage of firms that were returning 
cash to investors while also having a payout gap. 
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This figure was even greater before the financial crisis of 08/09 peaking at 
about 67 percent. Again this implies that the behavior of raising capital, 
only to return it to investors in the same period, is in fact something found 
in a large fraction (14-33 percent) throughout the 500 Nordic firms surveyed 
when looking at any given year. When including firms that have taped cash 
reserves in order to supplement their cash flows from their business to 
sustain their payout level the figure is over 50 percent during seven out of 
the ten years and only barely below 50 percent the remaining three. 
The fact that this is, in no way, an exceptional behavior becomes even more 
obvious when looking at the individual firm records over the entirety of the 
last decade. As illustrated in Chart 1C, 74 percent of all firms have had an 
extended payout gap at least one of the ten years included in this survey. 
Looking strictly at cash flows, a qualified majority of 54 percent have had a 
payout gap at least once during the decade in question. 
Chart 1C: Percentage of firms that has a payout gap 
during at least one of the ten years 
 
The above observations, concerning Chart 1A, 1B and 1C are based on 
4,742 data points, please refer to Table 1 in the appendix for a yearly 
breakdown of the number of data points. 
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6.2 The Relative and Absolute Size of Payouts Arising 
from Payout Gaps 
In Chart 2A we have calculated the total amount of cash returned to 
investors by firm and compared that to the same number when only 
including firms with a payout gap. The purpose of this is to illustrate; 
i. the nominal size of payouts on a yearly basis and 
ii. the importance of the payout gaps that firms are running in order to 
sustain the total level distributed to investors. 
Chart 2A suggests that there seems to be a tangible correlation between the 
amount paid out in total and the amount that are financed by payout gaps. 
The latter figure is quite stable over the years as a percentage of the former, 
averaging around 40 percent. For a precise examination of that percentage 
on an annual basis please refer to Chart 2B in the Appendix. 
Chart 2A: Aggregate size payouts from firms 
 
Given that we are already familiar with the number of firms that employ a 
payout gap we can readily display both the percentage of companies that 
employ a payout gap and how many percent of the total amount paid out 
these firms account for. By dividing these figure we are able to easily digest 
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to what extent firms with a payout gap pay more or less on average 
compared to firms that are returning cash to investors without tapping any 
form of external capital to cover their payouts. This last piece is illustrated 
by the line and is corresponding to the right hand side axis in Chart 2C. 
Chart 2C: Relative size of payouts from firms with 
payout gaps 
 
From Chart 2C we can clearly see that firms that employ a payout gap is 
definitely delivering less direct cash to investors on average compared to 
firms that do not employ a payout gap but do return cash in some form to 
investors. Only in 2007 and 2014 were firms with payout gaps on par with 
the other firms, meaning the payout gap multiplier is close to 1.00 during 
these years. 
The above observations, concerning Chart 2A, 2B (In appendix) and 1C are 
based on 4,620 data points, please refer to Table 2 in the Appendix for a 
yearly breakdown of the number of data points. 
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6.3 How Firms are Financing Their Payout Gaps 
In Chart 3 we can see the annual distribution between raised capital from the 
sale of equity compared to debt raised by the companies during the same 
period that they were operating with a payout gap. 
While we cannot say how much equity and debt respectively were used to 
finance the payout gap, we can get a clear sense for how they acquired 
additional capital during  a period, which in we know they did in fact need, 
to finance their payouts. 
As Chart 3 illustrates most money raised by firms with a payout gap is 
acquired via increasing their long term debt. The yearly average over the 10 
years that have been surveyed is ~78 percent with the remaining ~22 percent 
raised by selling or issuing equity. 
Chart 3A: Distribution between equity and debt 
raised to finance payout gaps 
 
In the next chart, Chart 3B, we display individual firms’ combinations of 
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and the another rather large group rely solely on debt. For the exact figures 
regarding these three groups please refer to Table 3A in the appendix. We 
can thus conclude that Chart 3A is not simply a measure of the number of 
firms that do simply one or the other, but does in fact paint a more nuanced 
picture of how the capital raising activities are distributed in terms their 
amount. 
Chart 3B: Individual firm behavior for accruing 
capital while having a payout gap. 
 
The above observations, concerning Chart 3A and 3B as well as Table 3A 
are based on 4,550 data points, please refer to Table 3B in the appendix for 
a yearly breakdown of the number of data points. 
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6.4 How Firms with Payout Gaps Return Cash to 
Investors 
By looking at how much money was returned by share repurchases 
compared dividends from firms with a payout gap. We can understand their 
relative distribution. As Chart 4 illustrates, most firms prefer dividends. 
Dividends account for a majority of cash returned during all ten years 
surveyed, with the exception of 2007, when share repurchases accounted for 
53% of all cash returned to investors. 
The third series indicate where the split between share repurchases and 
dividends takes place when looking at all firms, not just the ones with a 
payout gap. 
Chart 4: Distribution between dividends and share 
repurchases for firms with payout gaps 
 
The above observations, concerning Chart 4 are based on 4,550 data points, 
please refer to Table 4 in the appendix for a yearly breakdown of the 
number of data points. 
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
70% 
80% 
90% 
100% 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Share repurchase (Firms with payout gap) 
Dividens (Firms with payout gap) 
Distribution (All Firms) 
48 
 
6.5 Probit Model 
In Statistic 1A the output of the regression is shown. There are 2186 
included observations in the regression. Since firms who did not do any 
payouts are of no interest, they are excluded from the data sample in the 
regression.  
Out of the 9 estimated coefficients all except one has a significant p-value 
on the 1 % level. The only parameter where the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected is Strategic Holdings. The parameter estimations of ln(Capex), 
ln(Debt), ln(Market to book), ln(Operating Cash Flow) and ln(Dividends) 
show a very high significant level with a p-value of 0 which indicates a 
strong relation between the payout gap and the mentioned explanatory 
variables. 
For the original EViews extract please refer to Statistic 1B in the Appendix. 
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Statistic 1A: Binary Probit Regression Model 
 
Binary Probit  Model (Quadratic  Hil l  Climbing) 
Dependent Variable:  Payout gap exist  
Coeff ic ient 
 
Value 
 
Intercept 
S.E 
 
1.594938*** 
(0.221855)  
 
ln(Capex) 
S.E 
0.173754*** 
(0.024595)  
 
ln(Cash) 
S.E 
-0.071376*** 
(0.025963) 
 
ln(Debt) 
S.E 
0.149911*** 
(0.017538) 
 
ln(Market to Book) 
S.E 
0.194843*** 
(0.047145) 
 
ln(Operating Cash flow) 
S.E 
-0.675223*** 
(0.042448) 
 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 ∙ 10!! 
S.E 
0.026000*** 
(0.000728) 
 
Strategic Holdings 
S.E 
-0.001552 
(0.001298) 
 
ln(Dividends) 
S.E 
0.336025*** 
(0.033383) 
 
Pseudo-R2 
No. of Observations 
 
 
0.141737 
2186 
 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
In order to interpret the estimated coefficients, the average marginal effects 
are presented below in Table 5. Please refer to Statistic 2 in the Appendix 
for the original EViews excerpt. 
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Table 5: Average Marginal Effect 
Coeffic ient for Average Marginal  Effect  
ln(Capex) 0.058449 
ln(Cash) - 0.024010 
ln(Debt) 0.050429 
ln(Market to book) 0.065543 
ln(Operating Cash Flow) - 0.227139 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒10!  0.00759 
Strategic Holdings - 0.000522 
ln(Dividends) 0.113036 
 
The different variables’ average marginal effects on the probability of a 
payout gap can be seen in the table above. The variables ln(cash), 
ln(operating cash flow) and strategic holdings shows a negative relation 
with the probability of a payout gap. This means that for 1 unit increase in 
these variables, all else equal, the probability of a payout gap decreases with 
the respective marginal effect.  
The two variables with the greatest (absolute) independent marginal effects 
are ln(dividends) and ln(operating cash flow). A one unit increase in 
ln(operating cash flow), ceteris paribus, will lead to a reduction of 22.71 
percent probability of a payout gap while a 1 unit increase in ln(dividends) 
will lead to an increase of the payout gap probability by 11.3 percent.   
Since the pseudo R2-value has no natural interpretation in a Probit model as 
R2 in an OLS regression, the goodness of fit is presented in Statistic 2. 
In the first four subintervals the predicted number of observations differ 
quite a bit in comparison with the actual observations. In relative terms, the 
first group underestimates the number of payout gaps by !",!"!",!" = 44.9%, 
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while in the last group the predicted number of estimation is only 
underestimated by !,!"!"#,!" = 0.5%.  
Statistic 2: Goodness of Fit – Evaluation for 
Binary Spec. 
 
  
52 
 
Table 6 presents the mean values of all the explanatory variables. Only 
firms that made payouts are included in the average calculations. This can 
be interpreted as the sample average firm’s explanatory variables. By taking 
these values into the regression model, the probability of the average firm to 
have a payout gap is 59.11 %.  
Table 6: Average Firm Variables 
Variable Average Value 
ln(Capex) 9.211281 
ln(Cash) 10.26252 
ln(Debt) 10.96369 
ln(Market to book) 0.612626 
ln(Operating Cash Flow) 10.44994 
Size 1,992,757 
Strategic Holdings 35.65999 
ln(Dividends) 9.317793 
 
As can be seen in the chart 5, the calculated probability of having a payout 
gap of the average firm is plotted against the actual percentage of firms that 
had a payout gap while returning cash to the investors over the studied time 
period. 
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Chart 5: Comparison between actual percentage of 
firms with a payout gap while returning cash to 
investors and the average probability of a payout 
gap estimated by Probit model. 
 
The calculated probability of the average firm is located close to the actual 
numbers over the years. In the years 2006-2008 as well as 2009 the actual 
percentage of payout gap firms were higher than the predicted probability of 
the average firm. While during the remaining six years in the time period, 
the actual count of payout gap firms was fewer. 
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model 
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7 Analysis 
_____________________________________________________________ 
In this chapter we are analysing and discussing the results of our study in 
the light of the theory that have been presented. The chapter is founded on 
the questions asked in chapter 1.3 while each question constitutes a 
separate section of this chapter. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
7.1 To What Extent Does Nordic Firms Raise 
External Capital to Finance Their Payouts? 
The result of our study shows that between 30 to 60 per cent of the firms 
surveyed do raise capital externally each year to finance their payouts, as 
illustrated in Chart 1A. Moreover as brought up in the result and illustrated 
by Chart 1C a qualified majority, 74 per cent, of the firms surveyed, have, at 
some point during the ten year span raised capital externally to finance their 
payouts. This is in stark contrast to the commonly accepted theory as well as 
research by, inter alia, Grullon et al. (2002), DeAngelo et al. (2006), Ross et 
al. (2013) and Miller and Rock (1985). They all, to some degree, state that 
the basic idea behind making payouts relies on a firm’s will and/or ability to 
return free cash flows to investors, therefore payouts, in general, are 
financed by a firm’s free cash flow. Thus, a firm should make payouts when 
the internal cash flow of the firm is sufficient enough to fund the payout. 
Even when the free cash flow is sufficient enough, the firms are not obliged 
to make payouts, but may prioritize to use the free cash flow for investment 
purposes or as cash reserves.  
However, our study have shown that many firms within the Nordic stock 
markets do not behave as accordingly, returning only superfluous free cash 
flows to their investors. In fact, despite not having free cash flows sufficient 
to finance the payouts, they still engage in share repurchases and provide 
investors with dividends. This is even clearer when looking only at firms 
that are returning cash to investors, the percentage surge by close to 20 point 
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during all of the surveyed years. In fact most of the payout paying firms 
surveyed engage in such behavior for seven out of the ten years. These 
results are surprisingly similar to the results presented by Farre-Mensa et al. 
(2015) despite the fact that we are looking at an entirely different market. 
By looking at our own extended definition of payout gap in Chart 1A and 
1B, we do see a significant amount of firms that did not even have enough 
cash reserves from earlier years to finance their payouts. As seen in Chart 
1C, over 50 percent of the firms would, at some point in time during the 
sample period, technically speaking, have to declare bankruptcy due to their 
payout amount if they did not raise money on the capital market 
simultaneously. Although it is more likely that the firms in that case would 
reconsider the payout level instead, it is a remarkably high amount. The 
results of this study, most definitely, indicate underlying incentives for this 
behavior.            
Moreover, the article by Farre-Mensa et al. (2015) show, like Chart 2A-B, 
that firms rely on the capital markets to finance their payouts. The charts 
illustrates that it is not only a large number of firms with a payout gap but 
also a large nominal payout amount each year that is financed externally.  
As illustrated in Chart 2C, firms with a payout gap make dividends or 
repurchases to a smaller extent than firms without a payout gap, meaning 
that the payout multiplier is less than one during nine out of ten of the 
observed years. We can thus conclude that the payout payers, with a payout 
gap, on average gives less back to investors in nominal terms. This result is 
in line with the research of Miller and Rock (1985). Their research namely 
state that dividends will become larger if the surplus cash flow increases, 
while dividends will be smaller if it decreases primarily due to a higher 
amount of external financing. 
7.1.1 What Methods are Used to Bring in Capital? 
According to previous research, a firm can benefit from the market through 
two market timing strategies; either by issuing shares when the firm is 
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overvalued and then pay dividends, or by issuing equity when the firm is 
overvalued and then repurchase the shares when the firm is undervalued.  
Chart 3A-B illustrates that issuing debt is a more common choice than 
issuing equity. These results are in line with the pecking order theory, which 
implicates that a firm always use their retained earnings for financing 
purposes in the first place rather than issuing debt or equity. While the 
equity, if underpriced, is considered more expensive than underpriced debt, 
debt will be chosen beforehand. If the equity on the other hand is believed to 
be overpriced, issuing equity would be preferable. Since equity rarely is 
considered being overpriced due to the negative impact on the stock price, 
debt will reasonably be chosen beforehand anyway. In addition, Myers and 
Majluf (1984) state that it is better to, when financing payouts externally, 
issuing debt instead of issuing equity.  
The observed levels in Table 3A and Chart 3B show that close to half of the 
firms with a payout gap rely solely on debt to finance their payouts. There is 
no certain right or wrong regarding the level of optimal leverage, since it 
depends on factors such as the industry the company operates in. 
Furthermore, firms have to do trade-off decisions since there are tax shield 
benefits to gain from the usage of leverage. However, if the EBIT exceeds 
the interest payments there are no further tax shield gains to be made. It 
should be stressed though, that the more debt a firm uses, the higher the risk 
is to fall into financial distress. With this in mind, raising too much debt 
while, at the same time, using the raised capital to finance payouts, 
obviously, can be considered a risky strategy.  
The results from Table 3A and Chart 3B gives us reason to believe that one 
underlying reason to externally finance payouts may be to use the payout as 
a tool for capital structuring. To raise debt continuously over time, only to 
see the capital leave the firm through payouts, will render the firms with an 
increased level of leverage. However, this assumes that the value of the 
equity portion remains constant, which might not always be the case. In fact, 
stock operation like repurchases, regardless of how they are financed, are 
likely to affect the value of a firm’s equity.  
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Noteworthy in this paper is the large loss of data of share repurchases that 
may skew both the data and the analysis of it.  
7.1.2 What Methods are used to Return Capital to Investors? 
Brav et al. (2005) state that repurchases have become an important form of 
payout due to the flexibility of repurchases in relation to dividends. The 
repurchases namely “allows managers to alter payout in response to the 
availability of good investment opportunities, to accommodate time-varying 
attempts to affect EPS or stock valuation, to offset stock option dilution, or 
simply to return capital to investors at the appropriate time.”. In addition, 
there are tax shield benefits to gain for unlevered firms by making a 
leveraged recapitalization. 
Even though Brav et al. (2005) state that repurchases have become more 
important, they also state that dividends should prevail over repurchases as 
the primary way to return cash to investors, which is more in line with the 
result illustrated in Chart 4. 
If we compare the observed relationship between dividends and share 
repurchases for all firms in Chart 4 to the results of Farre-Mensa et al. 
(2015), we can note that their observations are more evenly distributed 
between dividends and repurchases with them overlapping at some points. 
Our results indicates that dividends have been the predominant payout form 
during the entire period of the study and have, steadily, been growing the 
last years to reach a very dominant level, leaving repurchases at less than a 
tenth of aggregate payouts. While this offers little additional context as to 
why that many firms have a payout gap, we can conclude that dividend is 
indeed the primary vehicles by which Nordic firms prefer to return cash to 
investors. 
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7.2 What are the Reasons to Externally Finance 
Payouts 
Researchers who discuss the financing of payouts mean that funding 
payouts even though the cash flow is low, is not recommended and is seen 
as “uneconomic and pointless” (Miller and Rock, 1985). The question that 
remains is therefore why our study, but also the study by Farre-Mensa et al. 
(2015), show that firms make payouts even though they cannot finance it 
through their free cash flow. We have identified four topics, each 
contributing a bit of insight as to what are likely  
7.2.1 Increase in Leverage 
Some of the results, for example Chart 3A-B, indicates that one of the 
reasons to finance the payouts through externally raised capital is to increase 
the leverage of a firm. We base this opinion on, inter alia, the reasoning 
made by Farre-Mensa et al. (2015), who state that financing payouts 
through the issuing of debt result in leverage increases since one of the 
advantages of making payouts, while issuing debt, is that it increases a 
firm’s leverage without increasing its cash holdings or depleting it. Firms 
might namely finance their payouts through the issuing of debt to manage 
their capital structure and cash holdings in a way that is hard to do through 
payouts or by raising debt individually. As we have stated earlier there are 
also tax shield benefits to gain from leveraging while distribute payouts, 
which may be correlated to adding leverage for payout-financing purposes. 
7.2.2 Signaling 
Another reason to why the firms raise capital externally to finance their 
payouts could be that the firm would like send signals to the market saying 
that the firm is doing well. As some researchers state, dividends can reveal 
information regarding a firm’s prospects, while changes in the dividend rate 
often generates changes in the market price. Thus, public firms show 
tendencies of prioritizing payouts due to the pressure on the managers of 
showing positive results in the short run.  
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In addition, the usage of signaling for payout financing purposes may derive 
from information asymmetries. Since insiders have superior information 
when information asymmetries are at hand, they may have incentives for 
increasing payouts if they know that difficult times awaits for the firm.  
However, we cannot see that signaling would be the predominant reason to 
why a firm would like to make payouts when their cash flow is low due to 
the cost of raising capital externally. We rather think of it as an extra reason 
among other more significant reasons. Farre-Mensa et al. (2015) argue that 
there is no ground for the statement that the signaling considerations is the 
main reason to why the firms make payouts even though they do not have a 
free cash flow sufficient for making the payouts. There are also previous 
studies indicating that payout policies are neither used to signal the strength 
of the firm as well as the ability of the firm to bear the costs of external 
capital if needed, nor to separate a firm from its competitors, as to the 
academic signaling sense. However, it has been stated that the signaling can 
affect the dividends in the sense that it makes firms hesitant to reduce their 
dividends, since not cutting dividends can separate a well-performing firm 
from competitors. 
To signal that a firm is doing well might also result in an increase in 
earnings-per-share, which we think constitutes a reason to make payouts 
even though the free cash flow is low. By financing the payouts with debt is 
an easy way for firms to boost their earnings per share and a firm that has 
the same EPS as another company but could do so with less equity is 
considered more efficient and a “better” firm by the market, which 
encourages this external payout financing phenomena. Since there is a 
general belief that firms that make higher payouts are more profitable it is 
intuitively to think that firm engage in this kind of activities for signaling 
reasons.  
On the other hand, our results indicates that payouts dropped significantly 
during the time of the financial crisis, a factor that speaks against payouts 
being made for signaling purposes. Intuitively, to signal that the firm is 
doing well during bad times such as a major crisis by making payouts would 
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be applicable to the signal theory. Since our findings are rather speaking for 
the opposite, that the payouts turned downwards, it weakens the implication 
regarding the impact of signaling. 
7.2.3 Engagement in Market Timing 
Farre-Mensa et al. (2015) also argues that one potential explanation to firms 
operating with a payout gap is to engage in market timing activities. They 
conclude that there are two possible scenarios in which firms could leverage 
externally financed payouts to do so; “First, managers can issue shares when 
their firm is overvalued and pay dividends throughout; such a policy makes 
existing shareholders better off, and it results in equity-financed dividends. 
Second, managers can issue equity when their firm is overvalued and 
repurchase shares when the firm is undervalued; if this cycle of over- and 
undervaluation takes place during the same year, it naturally results in 
equity-financed repurchases” (Farre-Mensa et al., 2015) While this seems to 
be a logical conclusion the result of our study does not indicate that this is a 
likely explanation to why such a significant part of the Nordic firms 
maintain a payout gap. Mostly because as illustrated by Chart 4 share 
repurchases have been quite rare, with the exception of 2007, but they are 
necessary in both above stated scenarios. In addition we can see that 
repurchases as a percentage of total payouts have decreased over the course 
of the last years further watering down this as a plausible explanation for 
why so many firms have a payout gap. At least in the markets surveyed in 
this study. 
7.3 Firm Characteristics Used to Predict the 
Probability of a Firm Having a Payout Gap 
The second part of our empirical study aimed to explain what variables 
could potentially contribute to the probability of a firm having a payout gap. 
From the Probit model we do see that we managed to find significant 
variables that partially explains the probability of a payout gap. It is really 
interesting that we do find firm characteristics among our data sample that 
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actually contributes to the probability of a firm having a payout gap. 
However it is difficult to interpret the goodness-of-fit since the pseudo-R2 
in the Probit is lacking a simple interpretation. One potential reason to the 
rather low pseudo-R2 of 0.141737 is due to the number of explanatory 
variables, it is intuitively to think that there are more than our nine chosen 
variables that affect the probability of a payout gap. If we instead look at the 
Hosmer-Lemeshow test it visualize, in our opinion, a rather good fit of the 
data, especially in the later subintervals. This means that our model is rather 
accurate in predicting the probability of payout gap and we can assume that 
our linear-log Probit model is well-specified.  
If we look at our estimated payout paying average firm’s probability of a 
payout gap of 59.11 percent it is rather surprising to see that the value is 
over 50 percent. This means that a payout payer average firm during a ten-
year period would, statistically speaking, have an active payout gap in six 
out of the ten years. We do not believe this fact is the general belief about 
payout payers and hope this observation shear some new light on how 
firms’ payout are financed.      
In the table below, all the variable we presented in the Results have been 
labeled discreetly. The following sections will discuss each outcome in 
relation to the previously presented variables and their results and our initial 
hypothesis concerning the variables. 
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Table 7: Variable Relation in Probit Model 
Variable Hypothesis  Result :  
Capex Positive Positive 
Cash Negative Negative 
Debt Positive Positive 
Market to book Positive Positive 
Operating Cashflow Negative Negative 
Size Positive Positive 
Strategic Holdings Negative Not significant 
Dividends Positive Positive 
 
7.3.1 Capex 
In Statistic 1A we can infer that capex has a significant effect on the 
probability of a payout gap. The relation between capex and payout gap is 
positive, which is intuitively. The results of the regression is in line with our 
hypothesis. If a firm has high capital expenditures and still make payouts it 
is naturally to believe the firm may have to raise external capital to fund the 
payouts.  
7.3.2 Cash  
A firm’s cash reserves is one out of two significant explanatory variables in 
our regression model that shows a negative relation with the probability of a 
payout gap. This is also an expected result since there are costs associated 
with raising external capital firms would deplete their own cash reserves 
before financing their payouts externally. 
7.3.3 Debt 
Statistic 1A infer that debt has a significant effect on the probability of a 
payout gap. Just like the relation between capex and payout gap, the relation 
between debt and payout gap is positive, which is intuitively and in line 
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with our hypothesis. If a firm issues debt to a great extent, it is not foreign to 
assume that the firm also uses the capital raised through debt to finance its 
payouts, if making payouts. 
7.3.4 Market to Book 
When it regards the market to book-ratio, it can be stated that also this ratio 
has a significant effect on the probability of a payout gap, please refer to 
Statistic 1A. The fact that the relation between market to book and payout 
gap is positive, is not a surprisingly result and is in line with our hypothesis. 
We assume that firms that have a high market to book value are, in order to 
keep their high valuation, willing to make payouts even if there is not 
enough cash. A firm with a high market to book value might namely meet 
investors with high expectations when it regards the value and the amount 
of payouts made, while the firms can end up in a situation where they 
neither have the possibility to diminish the value of the payouts, nor the 
actual amount of payouts made. 
7.3.5 Operating Cash Flow 
The second and last significant explanatory variable that shows a negative 
correlation with the probability of a payout gap is operating cash flow. This 
result does not surprise us and are in line with our hypothesis. If a firm 
internally can generate a lot of cash,  it is a sign of a prosperous firm and do 
not need external financing to the same extent to operate the business and it 
seems rather contra-intuitively to use more expensive, external capital, to 
finance the payouts.  
7.3.6 Size 
The size of a firm, i.e. the total turnover, has a significant effect on the 
probability of a payout gap, which is shown in Statistic 1A. The same 
occurs for the size as for most of the variables above, namely that the 
relation between size and payout gap is positive. This result is in line with 
previous research but is interesting since we, intuitively, were not sure to 
what extent the size would affect the probability of payout gap. However, it 
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feels rather logical that the size of a firm, i.e. the size of the total turnover, 
does affect a firm’s choice of making payouts. A firm with a high total 
turnover would probably have many stakeholders, which the firm has to 
take into account when making different decisions, but also has to please. 
The stakeholders might expect the firm to make payouts to a greater extent 
than they do when the firm is smaller. 
7.3.7 Strategic Holdings 
This was the only variables that did not show a significant relation with the 
probability of a payout gap. This means that institutional investors did not 
have as big impact in the decision of not distributing payouts when the 
internal funding was not enough as we expected. However we do se 
tendencies that institutional investors are against external financed payout 
since the estimated parameter is negative but we cannot make any deeper 
analysis of this variable since it is not statistically significant distinct from 
zero.  
7.3.8 Dividends 
As mentioned earlier, we only included dividends in the model to test the 
legitimacy of the regression model. It should come to no surprise to anyone 
that dividends has a strongly positive relation with the probability of a 
payout gap. This is the single most contributing variable to the probability 
of a payout gap and is statistically significant we a p-value of 0.0000 and 
this results is not of a big surprise to us.    
7.4 Variable Impact 
To conclude this section, we can say that the firms with a high market to 
book-ratio, which also make dividends to a higher extent are the ones with 
the highest probability of having a payout gap. Meanwhile, the firms with a 
lot of cash and a positive operating cash flow are the ones with a 
significantly lower probability of having a payout gap. 
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7.4 Further Research 
Beyond the discussion regarding the question asked in the beginning of this 
research, the result of this study have generated some other thoughts when it 
regards the externally financed payout that we think is crucial to mention. 
When gathering the data of the targeted firms in Chart 1A-B and Chart 2A, 
we could see that the graphs, in the year following the crash of 2008, 
diverged from the general pattern, i.e. an effect likely to the financial crisis. 
Chart 1A-B illustrate the firms with a payout gap, and during the year of 
2009 the amount of firms having a payout gap decreased remarkably. The 
reasons to this tendency could be many, but it can be concluded without a 
doubt that the number of firms (Chart 1A-B) as well as the relative size of 
externally financed payouts in relation to the total amount returned to 
investors decreased drastically during the financial crisis This is also true 
when looking at the figures for the U.S market produced by Farre-Mensa et 
al. (2015). A further study looking particularly at the causes behind this 
collapse by looking holistically at cash surpluses, or lack thereof, and firm 
payout behavior seems fully warranted. 
Our research is limited to the Nordic stock markets. Since a similar study 
already have been made in the U.S., it would be interesting to see if the 
phenomenon of externally financed payouts is as widespread throughout the 
rest of Europe, The Nordic NASDAQ OMX stock markets is composed of 
firms from Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Sweden. Due to time limitations 
we have not been able to further investigate if there exist any differences 
regarding firms’ behavior of payout financing between the countries. 
Another aspect that has not been taken into account in this study is whether 
the industry that the firms operate in has effect on their behavior relating to 
payouts. Both these topics would be great ways to expand on the research of 
this subject. 
We have also not made any further investigations regarding how firms that 
have raised capital to finance payouts did perform on the stock market after 
doing so. It would be interesting to see if there are any possible differences 
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between the performance of the firms that finance their payouts with the 
free cash flow and the ones that does it with external funds. 
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8 Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper was to investigate if firms listed on the Nordic 
stock market raise external funds in order to finance payouts. Our findings 
indicate that there are a significant amount of firms that engage in this kind 
of behavior. The study, inter alia, shows that the firms with a high market to 
book-ratio, which also make dividends to a higher extent are the ones with 
the highest probability of having a payout gap. Meanwhile, the firms with a 
lot of cash and a positive operating cash flow are the ones with a 
significantly lower probability of having a payout gap. 
The test results regarding the chosen variables that we thought were to be 
correlated with financing payouts externally showed that our initial 
perception concerning the firms characteristics, related to the phenomenon, 
were intuitively correct since we were able to prove significance in seven 
out of the eight studied variables. 
We have shown that the most common way of raising capital externally is 
through the issuing of debt, while the distribution of dividends is the most 
commonly used payout policy. The question that remains is though why 
firms choose to finance their payouts though externally raised capital, even 
though the concept of externally financing payouts contravenes the theory 
of how to finance payouts. 
We think that the reasons behind this behavior are many and rather complex 
and we have not been able to pinpoint one certain key driver behind the 
phenomenon. However, desires such as the will to increase the leverage of a 
firm and a firm’s need to send signals to the market do have an impact. The 
fact that there is no clear answer to why firms would choose to make a 
payout policy decision that is so counterintuitive to both the theory, as well 
as the results of many researches, makes us believe that further studies 
within the area would be preferable. This phenomenon is namely 
comparatively uncharted, why we think that more studies within the area are 
to come. 
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Appendix 
Charts 
Chart 1A: Percentage of all firms that have a payout gap 
 
Chart 1B: Percentage of firms that were returning cash to 
investors while also having a payout gap 
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Chart 1C: Percentage of firms that has a payout gap during at 
least one of the ten years 
 
Chart 2A: Aggregate size payouts from firms 
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Chart 2B: Relative size of payouts from firms with payout gaps 
 
 
Chart 2C: Relative size of payouts from firms with payout gaps 
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Chart 3A: Distribution between equity and debt raised to finance 
payout gaps 
 
Chart 3B: Individual firm behavior for accruing capital while 
having a payout gap. 
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Chart 4: Distribution between dividends and share repurchases 
for firms with payout gaps 
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Statistics 
 
Statistic 1A: Binary Probit Regression Model 
Binary Probit  Model (Quadratic  Hil l  Climbing) 
Dependent Variable:  Payout gap exist  
Coeff ic ient 
 
Value 
 
Intercept 
S.E 
 
1.594938*** 
(0.221855)  
 
ln(Capex) 
S.E 
0.173754*** 
(0.024595)  
 
ln(Cash) 
S.E 
-0.071376*** 
(0.025963) 
 
ln(Debt) 
S.E 
0.149911*** 
(0.017538) 
 
ln(Market to Book) 
S.E 
0.194843*** 
(0.047145) 
 
ln(Operating Cash flow) 
S.E 
-0.675223*** 
(0.042448) 
 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 ∙ 10!! 
S.E 
0.026000*** 
(0.000728) 
 
Strategic Holdings 
S.E 
-0.001552*** 
(0.001298) 
 
ln(Dividends) 
S.E 
0.336025*** 
(0.033383) 
 
Pseudo-R2 
No. of Observations 
 
 
0.141737 
2186 
 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Statistic 1B: Binary Probit Regression Model  
 
 
 
Statistic 2: Average Marginal Effect in Probit Model 
 
78 
 
Statistic 3: Goodness of Fit – Evaluation for Binary Model 
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Statistic 4A: Payouts (ln) 
 
Statistic 4B: Capex (ln) 
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  Statistic 4C: Cash (ln) 
 
Statistic 4D: Debt (ln) 
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Statistic 4E: Dividends (ln) 
 
Statistic 4F: Market to Book Value (ln)
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Statistic 4G: Operating Cash Flow (ln) 
 
Statistic 4H: Strategic Holdings 
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Statistic 4I: Size (Earnings) 
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Tables 
Table 1: Number of Observations in Chart 1A, 1B and 1C 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
419 434 455 463 478 495 502 508 507 481 
 
Table 2: Number of Observations in Chart 2A, 2B and 2C 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
417 424 435 457 465 486 494 503 505 477 
 
Table 3A: Method for accruing capital while having a payout gap. 
No Debt / Only 
Equity 
Mix of Debt and 
Equity 
Only Debt / No 
Equity 
10,77% 43,07% 46.16% 
 
Table 3B: Number of Observations in Chart 3A & 3B 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
408 408 426 438 454 480 480 493 500 463 
 
Table 4: Number of Observations in Chart 4 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
417 424 436 458 466 487 495 503 506 478 
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Table 5: Average Marginal Effect 
Coeffic ient for  Average Marginal  Effect 
ln(Capex) 0.058449 
ln(Cash) - 0.024010 
ln(Debt) 0.050429 
ln(Market to book) 0.065543 
ln(Operating Cash Flow) - 0.227139 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒10!  0.00759 
Strategic Holdings - 0.000522 
ln(Dividends) 0.113036 
 
Table 6: Average Firm Variables 
Variable Average Value 
ln(Capex) 9.211281 
ln(Cash) 10.26252 
ln(Debt) 10.96369 
ln(Market to book) 0.612626 
ln(Operating Cash Flow) 10.44994 
Size 1,992,757 
Strategic Holdings 35.65999 
ln(Dividends) 9.317793 
 
  
86 
 
Table 7: Variable Relation in Probit Model 
Variable Hypothesis  Result :  
Capex Positive Positive 
Cash Negative Negative 
Debt Positive Positive 
Market to book Positive Positive 
Operating Cashflow Negative Negative 
Size Positive Positive 
Strategic Holdings Negative Not significant 
Dividends Positive Positive 
 
 
  
87 
 
Table 8: All Datastream variables and their respective code 
Variable 
Name 
Datastream 
Code Short Description 
 
Units  
 
Share 
Buyback 
Amount 
X(ECSLDP048)~E 
 
The total monetary value of the 
shares repurchased by the 
company during the fiscal year. 
 
Please note: only quarterly data 
available 
 
 
Euros 
(Nominal) 
 
Cash 
Dividends 
Paid Total 
X(WC04551)~E 
 
The total common and 
preferred dividends paid to 
shareholders of the company. 
 
 
Euros (000’) 
 
Net Cash 
Flow 
Investing 
X(WC04870)~E 
 
The net cash receipts and 
disbursements resulting from 
capital expenditures, 
decrease/increase from 
investments, disposal of fixed 
assets, increase in other assets 
and other investing activities. 
 
Euros (000’) 
 
Net Cash 
Flow 
Operating 
Activities 
X(WC04860)~E 
 
The net cash receipts and 
disbursements resulting from 
the operations of the company. 
It is the sum of Funds from 
Operations, Funds From/Used 
for Other Operating Activities 
and Extraordinary Items. 
 
Euros (000’) 
 
 
Long Term 
Debt 
 
X(WC03251)~E 
 
All interest bearing financial 
obligations, excluding amounts 
due within one year. It is shown 
net of premium or discount. 
 
Euros (000’) 
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Net 
Proceeds 
From Sale 
/ Issue Of 
Common 
& 
Preferred 
X(WC04251)~E 
 
The amount a company 
received from the sale of 
common and/or preferred 
stock. It includes amounts 
received from the conversion of 
debentures or preferred stock 
into common stock, exchange 
of common stock for 
debentures, sale of treasury 
shares, shares issued for 
acquisitions and proceeds from 
stock options. 
 
Euros (000’) 
 
Market 
Cap X(MVC) ~E 
 
MVC is the consolidated 
market value of a company 
displayed in millions of units of 
local currency. It is available as 
a time series for 17 countries 
(see below). History for those 
countries starts on 3rd January 
2000, or on the base date of the 
security if that is later. 
 
Euros (000’) 
 
Cash & 
Equivalents 
Generic 
X(WC02005)~E 
 
CASH & EQUIVALENTS – 
GENERIC represents Cash & 
Due from Banks for Banks, 
Cash for Insurance companies 
and Cash & Short Term 
Investments for all other 
industries. 
 
 
Euros (000’) 
 
Strategic 
Number of 
Shares 
NOSHST 
 
The percentage of strategic 
holdings of 5% or more. 
 
% 
Price to 
Book PTBV 
 
This is the share price divided 
by the book value per share. 
 
Ratio 
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Table 9: List of all surveyed firms 
Firm Name ICB ISO ICIN 
OSTJYDSK BANK  Banks  DK DK0010017607 
A P MOLLER - MAERSK 
'B'  Marine Transportation  DK DK0010244508 
AALBORG 
BOLDSPILKLUB  Recreational Services  DK DK0010247014 
AARHUSKARLSHAMN  Food Products  SE SE0001493776 
ARHUS ELITE 'B'  Recreational Services  DK DK0010263722 
ABB LTD N  Industrial Machinery  CH CH0012221716 
ACANDO 'B'  Computer Services  SE SE0000105116 
ACTIVE BIOTECH  Biotechnology  SE SE0001137985 
ADDNODE 'B'  Computer Services  SE SE0000472268 
ADDTECH 'B'  Electrical Equipment  SE SE0005568136 
ADMIRAL CAPITAL B  Real Estate Hold, Dev  DK DK0060052843 
AEROCRINE 'B'  Medical Equipment  SE SE0000434292 
AF 'B'  Business Support Svs.  SE SE0005999836 
AFARAK GROUP  General Mining  FI FI0009800098 
AFFECTO  Computer Services  FI FI0009013312 
AFRICA OIL  Exploration & Prod.  CA CA00829Q1019 
AHLSTROM  Paper  FI FI0009010391 
AKTIA 'R'  Banks  FI FI4000058888 
ALFA LAVAL  Industrial Machinery  SE SE0000695876 
ALK-ABELLO  Pharmaceuticals  DK DK0060027142 
ALLENEX  Biotechnology  SE SE0000619181 
ALLTELE 
ALLM.SVEN.TELAB  Fixed Line Telecom.  SE SE0001625534 
ALM BRAND  Full Line Insurance  DK DK0015250344 
ALMA MEDIA  Publishing  FI FI0009013114 
AMBU 'B'  Medical Equipment  DK DK0060591204 
AMER SPORTS  Recreational Products  FI FI0009000285 
ANDERSEN & MARTINI  Specialty Retailers  DK DK0010283597 
ANOTO GROUP  Computer Hardware  SE SE0000547929 
APETIT  Food Products  FI FI0009003503 
ARCAM 'B'  Industrial Machinery  SE SE0005676160 
ARCTIC PAPER  Paper  PL PLARTPR00012 
ARISE  Alt. Electricity  SE SE0002095604 
ARKIL HOLDING  Heavy Construction  DK DK0010025113 
REALIA  Real Estate Hold, Dev  DK DK0010131309 
ASIAKASTIETO GROUP  Specialty Finance  FI FI4000123195 
ASPO  Divers. Industrials  FI FI0009008072 
ASPOCOMP GROUP  Electrical Equipment  FI FI0009008080 
ASSA ABLOY 'B'  Building Mat.& Fix.  SE SE0000255648 
ASTRAZENECA  Pharmaceuticals  GB GB0009895292 
ATLANTIC PETROLEUM  Exploration & Prod.  DK FO000A0DN9X4 
ATLAS COPCO 'B'  Industrial Machinery  SE SE0000122467 
ATRIA 'A'  Food Products  FI FI0009006548 
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ATRIUM LJUNGBERG 'B'  Real Estate Hold, Dev  SE SE0000191827 
AURIGA INDUSTRIES 'B'  Specialty Chemicals  DK DK0010233816 
AUTOLIV SDB  Auto Parts  US SE0000382335 
AVANZA BANK 
HOLDING  Investment Services  SE SE0000170110 
AVEGA GROUP 'B'  Computer Services  SE SE0002180539 
AXFOOD  Food Retail,Wholesale  SE SE0006993770 
AXIS  Computer Hardware  SE SE0000672354 
B&B TOOLS 'B'  Industrial Suppliers  SE SE0000101362 
BACTIGUARD HOLD  Medical Supplies  SE SE0005878741 
BANG & OLUFSEN 'B'  Consumer Electronics  DK DK0010218429 
ALANDSBANKEN 'B'  Banks  FI FI0009001127 
BANKNORDIK  Banks  DK FO0000000088 
BASWARE  Software  FI FI0009008403 
BAVARIAN NORDIC  Biotechnology  DK DK0015998017 
BE GROUP  Iron & Steel  SE SE0001852211 
BEIJER ALMA 'B'  Industrial Machinery  SE SE0000190134 
BEIJER ELECTRONICS  Electronic Equipment  SE SE0000671711 
BEIJER REF AB  Industrial Machinery  SE SE0000112906 
BERGS TIMBER 'B'  Forestry  SE SE0000101297 
BERLIN IV 'B'  Real Estate Hold, Dev  DK DK0060085694 
BESQAB PROJEKT & 
FASTIGH  Real Estate Hold, Dev  SE SE0005991411 
BETSSON 'B'  Gambling  SE SE0005936911 
BILIA 'A'  Specialty Retailers  SE SE0000102295 
BILLERUD KORSNAS  Paper  SE SE0000862997 
BIOGAIA 'B'  Biotechnology  SE SE0000470395 
BIOHIT 'B'  Medical Supplies  FI FI0009005482 
BIOINVENT INTL.  Biotechnology  SE SE0000789711 
BIOPORTO  Biotechnology  DK DK0011048619 
BIOTAGE  Biotechnology  SE SE0000454746 
BIOTIE THERAPIES  Biotechnology  FI FI0009011571 
BJORN BORG  Clothing & Accessory  SE SE0005849437 
BLACK EARTH FARMING 
SDB  Farm Fish Plantation  SE SE0001882291 
BLACKPEARL 
RESOURCES SDR  Exploration & Prod.  CA SE0002060863 
BLUE VISION  Real Estate Hold, Dev  DK DK0060278737 
BOCONCEPT HOLDING 
'B'  Furnishings  DK DK0060050201 
BOLIDEN  General Mining  SE SE0000869646 
BONG  Business Support Svs.  SE SE0000396061 
BOULE DIAGNOSTICS 
(WI)  Medical Equipment  SE SE0000437402 
BRD KLEE 'B'  Industrial Machinery  DK DK0010129089 
BRODRENE HARTMANN 
'B'  Containers & Package  DK DK0010256197 
BRONDBY IF  Recreational Services  DK DK0010247956 
BTS GROUP  Bus.Train & Employmnt  SE SE0000805426 
BUFAB  Industrial Suppliers  SE SE0005677135 
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BULTEN  Auto Parts  SE SE0003849223 
BURE EQUITY  Specialty Finance  SE SE0000195810 
BYGGMAX GROUP  Home Improvement Ret.  SE SE0003303627 
CAPMAN 'B'  Specialty Finance  FI FI0009009377 
CARGOTEC 'B'  Comm. Vehicles,Trucks  FI FI0009013429 
CARLSBERG 'B'  Brewers  DK DK0010181759 
CASTELLUM  Real Estate Hold, Dev  SE SE0000379190 
CATENA  Real Estate Hold, Dev  SE SE0001664707 
CAVERION 
CORPORATION  Business Support Svs.  FI FI4000062781 
CAVOTEC  Divers. Industrials  SE CH0136071542 
CBRAIN  Software  DK DK0060030286 
CELLAVISION  Medical Equipment  SE SE0000683484 
CENCORP  Electronic Equipment  FI FI0009006951 
CHEMOMETEC  Medical Equipment  DK DK0060055861 
CHR HANSEN HOLDING  Biotechnology  DK DK0060227585 
CITYCON  Real Estate Hold, Dev  FI FI0009002471 
CLAS OHLSON 'B'  Home Improvement Ret.  SE SE0000584948 
CLOETTA 'B'  Food Products  SE SE0002626861 
COLOPLAST 'B'  Medical Supplies  DK DK0060448595 
COLUMBUS  Computer Services  DK DK0010268366 
COM HEM HOLDINGS  Fixed Line Telecom.  SE SE0005999778 
COMPONENTA  Industrial Machinery  FI FI0009010110 
COMPTEL  Software  FI FI0009008221 
CONCENTRIC  Industrial Machinery  SE SE0003950864 
CONCORDIA MARITIME 
'B'  Marine Transportation  SE SE0000102824 
CONSILIUM 'B'  Electronic Equipment  SE SE0000236382 
COPENHAGEN 
NETWORK  Computer Services  DK DK0060055515 
COREM PROPERTY 
GROUP  Real Estate Hold, Dev  SE SE0002257402 
C-RAD 'B'  Medical Equipment  SE SE0002016352 
CRAMO  Business Support Svs.  FI FI0009900476 
CTT SYSTEMS  Aerospace  SE SE0000418923 
CYBERCOM GROUP 
EUROPE  Internet  SE SE0000702169 
DMPKBT.NORDEN  Marine Transportation  DK DK0060083210 
DANSKE 
ANDELSKASSERS BK.  Banks  DK DK0060299063 
DANSKE BANK  Banks  DK DK0010274414 
DANTAX RADIO  Consumer Electronics  DK DK0015205637 
DANTHERM  Building Mat.& Fix.  DK DK0010223692 
DEDICARE  Healthcare Providers  SE SE0003909282 
DFDS  Marine Transportation  DK DK0010259027 
DGC ONE  Fixed Line Telecom.  SE SE0002571539 
DIGIA  Computer Services  FI FI0009007983 
DIOS FASTIGHETER  Real Estate Hold, Dev  SE SE0001634262 
DJURSLANDS BANK  Banks  DK DK0060136273 
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DALHOFF LAR.& 
HORNEMAN  Industrial Suppliers  DK DK0060038933 
DORO  Telecom. Equipment  SE SE0000215493 
DOVRE GROUP  Business Support Svs.  FI FI0009008098 
DSV 'B'  Trucking  DK DK0060079531 
DUNI  Nondur.Household Prod  SE SE0000616716 
DUROC 'B'  Electronic Equipment  SE SE0000331266 
DUSTIN GROUP  Specialty Retailers  SE SE0006625471 
EAST CAPITAL 
EXPLORER  Specialty Finance  SE SE0002158568 
EFORE  Electronic Equipment  FI FI0009900054 
EGETAEPPER 'B'  Furnishings  DK DK0060458206 
EIK FASTEIGNAFELAG  Real Estate Hold, Dev  IS IS0000020709 
EIMSKIPAFELAG ISLAND  Marine Transportation  IS IS0000019800 
ELANDERS 'B'  Business Support Svs.  SE SE0000119299 
ELECSTER 'A'  Industrial Machinery  FI FI0009900658 
ELECTRA GRUPPEN  Specialty Retailers  SE SE0001572520 
ELECTROLUX 'B'  Dur. Household Prod.  SE SE0000103814 
ELEKTA 'B'  Medical Equipment  SE SE0000163628 
ELEKTROBIT  Software  FI FI0009007264 
ELISA  Fixed Line Telecom.  FI FI0009007884 
ELOS 'B'  Medical Equipment  SE SE0000120776 
ELTEL  Divers. Industrials  SE SE0006509949 
ENDOMINES  Gold Mining  SE SE0001803131 
ENEA  Computer Services  SE SE0005851268 
ENIRO  Publishing  SE SE0000718017 
ENQUEST  Exploration & Prod.  GB GB00B635TG28 
EOLUS VIND B  Renewable Energy Eq.  SE SE0002109330 
EPISURF MEDICAL  Medical Supplies  SE SE0003491562 
EQ  Specialty Finance  FI FI0009009617 
ERICSSON 'B'  Telecom. Equipment  SE SE0000108656 
ERRIA  Transport Services  DK DK0060101483 
ETRION  Alt. Electricity  CA CA29786T1057 
ETTEPLAN  Business Support Svs.  FI FI0009008650 
EWORK SCANDINAVIA  Business Support Svs.  SE SE0002402701 
EXEL COMPOSITES  Industrial Machinery  FI FI0009007306 
EXIQON  Biotechnology  DK DK0060077758 
EXPEDIT 'B'  Furnishings  DK DK0015312474 
FE BORDING 'B'  Business Support Svs.  DK DK0010008028 
FABEGE  Real Estate Hold, Dev  SE SE0000950636 
FAGERHULT  Building Mat.& Fix.  SE SE0005935558 
FAST EJENDOM 
DANMARK  Unclassified  DK DK0060522746 
FAST PARTNER  Real Estate Hold, Dev  SE SE0000224446 
FASTIGHETS BALDER 'B'  Real Estate Hold, Dev  SE SE0000455057 
FEELGOOD SVENSKA  Healthcare Providers  SE SE0000381840 
FENIX OUTDOOR INTL  Unclassified  SE CH0242214887 
FINGERPRINT CARDS 'B'  Electronic Equipment  SE SE0000422107 
FINNAIR  Airlines  FI FI0009003230 
FINNLINES  Marine Transportation  FI FI0009003644 
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FIRSTFARMS  Farm Fish Plantation  DK DK0060056166 
FISKARS 'A'  Dur. Household Prod.  FI FI0009000400 
FJARSKIPTI  Mobile Telecom.  IS IS0000020485 
FLSMIDTH & CO.'B'  Building Mat.& Fix.  DK DK0010234467 
FLUGGER 'B'  Building Mat.& Fix.  DK DK0010218189 
FORMPIPE SOFTWARE  Software  SE SE0001338039 
FORTUM  Con. Electricity  FI FI0009007132 
F-SECURE  Software  FI FI0009801310 
FYNSKE BANK  Banks  DK DK0060520377 
G4S  Business Support Svs.  GB GB00B01FLG62 
G5 ENTERTAINMENT  Toys  SE SE0001824004 
GABRIEL HOLDING  Clothing & Accessory  DK DK0060124691 
GENMAB  Biotechnology  DK DK0010272202 
GERMAN HI.STR.PROPS.  Retail REITs  DK DK0060093524 
GETINGE  Medical Equipment  SE SE0000202624 
GEVEKO 'B'  Heavy Construction  SE SE0000105264 
GLASTON  Building Mat.& Fix.  FI FI0009010219 
GLOBAL HEALTH 
PARTNERS  Healthcare Providers  SE SE0002579912 
GLUNZ & JENSEN  Industrial Machinery  DK DK0010249309 
GN STORE NORD  Medical Equipment  DK DK0010272632 
GRANGES  Auto Parts  SE SE0006288015 
GREENTECH ENERGY 
SYS.  Alt. Electricity  DK DK0010240514 
GRONLANDSBANKEN  Banks  DK DK0010230630 
GUNNEBO  Electronic Equipment  SE SE0000195570 
GYLDENDAL 'B'  Publishing  DK DK0010247600 
H&H INTERNATIONAL  Building Mat.& Fix.  DK DK0015202451 
HAGAR  Broadline Retailers  IS IS0000020121 
HALDEX  Auto Parts  SE SE0000105199 
HARBOES BRYGGERI 'B'  Brewers  DK DK0060014751 
HB GRANDI HF  Farm Fish Plantation  IS IS0000000297 
HEBA 'B'  Real Estate Hold, Dev  SE SE0000236515 
HEMFOSA FASTIGHETER  Real Estate Hold, Dev  SE SE0005731171 
HEMTEX  Home Improvement Ret.  SE SE0000698268 
HENNES & MAURITZ 'B'  Apparel Retailers  SE SE0000106270 
HEXAGON 'B'  Electronic Equipment  SE SE0000103699 
HEXPOL 'B'  Specialty Chemicals  SE SE0002452623 
HIQ INTERNATIONAL  Computer Services  SE SE0006886727 
HKSCAN 'A'  Food Products  FI FI0009006308 
HMS NETWORKS  Telecom. Equipment  SE SE0002136242 
HOIST FINANCE  Specialty Finance  SE SE0006887063 
HOJGAARD HLDG.'B'  Heavy Construction  DK DK0010255975 
HOLMEN 'B'  Paper  SE SE0000109290 
HONKARAKENNE 'B'  Home Construction  FI FI0009900104 
HUFVUDSTADEN 'C'  Real Estate Hold, Dev  SE SE0000170383 
HUHTAMAKI  Containers & Package  FI FI0009000459 
HUSQVARNA 'B'  Dur. Household Prod.  SE SE0001662230 
HVIDBJERG BANK  Banks  DK DK0060135978 
I A R SYSTEMS GROUP  Software  SE SE0005851706 
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IC GROUP  Clothing & Accessory  DK DK0010221803 
ICA GRUPPEN  Food Retail,Wholesale  SE SE0000652216 
ICELANDAIR GROUP  Airlines  IS IS0000013464 
ILKKA YHTYMA  Publishing  FI FI0009800205 
IMAGE SYSTEMS  Electronic Equipment  SE SE0006421871 
INCAP  Electrical Equipment  FI FI0009006407 
INDL.& FINL.SYS.'B'  Computer Services  SE SE0000189946 
INDUSTRIVARDEN 'C'  Specialty Finance  SE SE0000107203 
INDUTRADE  Electronic Equipment  SE SE0001515552 
INNOFACTOR  Software  FI FI0009007637 
INTELLECTA 'B'  Business Support Svs.  SE SE0000135287 
INTERMAIL 'B'  Business Support Svs.  DK DK0010212224 
INTRUM JUSTITIA  Specialty Finance  SE SE0000936478 
INVESTOR 'B'  Specialty Finance  SE SE0000107419 
INWIDO  Building Mat.& Fix.  SE SE0006220018 
ISS AS  Business Support Svs.  DK DK0060542181 
ITAB SHOP CONCEPT 'B'  Business Support Svs.  SE SE0005992567 
IXONOS  Computer Services  FI FI0009008007 
JEUDAN  Real Estate Hold, Dev  DK DK0010171362 
JM  Real Estate Hold, Dev  SE SE0000806994 
JUTLANDER BANK  Banks  DK DK0060050045 
JYSKE BANK  Banks  DK DK0010307958 
KABE HUSVAGNAR 'B'  Recreational Products  SE SE0000107724 
KAPPAHL  Apparel Retailers  SE SE0001630880 
KARO BIO  Biotechnology  SE SE0000571416 
KAROLINSKA 
DEVELOPMENT (WI)  Pharmaceuticals  SE SE0002190926 
KEMIRA  Specialty Chemicals  FI FI0009004824 
KESKISUOMALAINEN  Publishing  FI FI0009007546 
KESKO 'B'  Food Retail,Wholesale  FI FI0009000202 
KESLA 'A'  Comm. Vehicles,Trucks  FI FI0009900237 
KINNEVIK 'B'  Specialty Finance  SE SE0000164626 
KLOVERN B  Real Estate Hold, Dev  SE SE0006593919 
KNOW IT  Computer Services  SE SE0000421273 
KOBENHAVNS 
LUFTHAVNE  Transport Services  DK DK0010201102 
KONE 'B'  Industrial Machinery  FI FI0009013403 
KONECRANES  Comm. Vehicles,Trucks  FI FI0009005870 
KREDITBANKEN  Banks  DK DK0010253764 
KUNGSLEDEN  Real Estate Hold, Dev  SE SE0000549412 
LAGERCRANTZ GROUP 
'B'  Electronic Equipment  SE SE0000808396 
LAMMHULTS DESIGN 
GROUP  Furnishings  SE SE0000386138 
LAN & SPAR BANK  Banks  DK DK0010201532 
LAND & LEISURE 'B'  Hotels  DK DK0010240860 
LASSILA & TIKANOJA  Waste, Disposal Svs.  FI FI0009010854 
LATOUR INVESTMENT 
'B'  Specialty Finance  SE SE0000106320 
LEMMINKAINEN  Heavy Construction  FI FI0009900336 
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LIFCO B  Divers. Industrials  SE SE0006370730 
LINDAB 
INTERNATIONAL  Building Mat.& Fix.  SE SE0001852419 
LOLLANDS BANK  Banks  DK DK0060000107 
LOOMIS 'B'  Business Support Svs.  SE SE0002683557 
LUCARA DIAMOND  Diamonds & Gemstones  CA CA54928Q1081 
H LUNDBECK  Pharmaceuticals  DK DK0010287234 
LUNDBERGFORETAGEN 
'B'  Specialty Finance  SE SE0000108847 
LUNDIN GOLD  Gold Mining  CA CA5503711080 
LUNDIN MINING SDB  Nonferrous Metals  CA SE0001134529 
LUNDIN PETROLEUM  Exploration & Prod.  SE SE0000825820 
INVSTSSL.LUXOR  Investment Services  DK DK0010213628 
MALMBERGS 
ELEKTRISKA 'B'  Electrical Equipment  SE SE0000507659 
MAREL  Industrial Machinery  IS IS0000000388 
MARIMEKKO  Clothing & Accessory  FI FI0009007660 
MARTELA 'A'  Furnishings  FI FI0009900385 
MATAS  Specialty Retailers  DK DK0060497295 
MEDA 'A'  Pharmaceuticals  SE SE0000221723 
MEDIVIR 'B'  Biotechnology  SE SE0000273294 
MEKONOMEN  Auto Parts  SE SE0002110064 
MELKER SCHORLING  Specialty Finance  SE SE0001785270 
METSA BOARD 'B'  Paper  FI FI0009000665 
METSO  Industrial Machinery  FI FI0009007835 
MICRO SYSTEMATION 
'B'  Software  SE SE0000526626 
MIDSONA 'B'  Personal Products  SE SE0000565228 
MIDWAY HOLDINGS 'B'  Specialty Finance  SE SE0000122673 
MIGATRONIC 'B'  Industrial Machinery  DK DK0010225127 
MILLICOM 
INTL.CELU.SDR  Mobile Telecom.  LU SE0001174970 
MOBERG PHARMA  Pharmaceuticals  SE SE0003613090 
MODERN TIMES 
GP.MTG 'B'  Broadcast & Entertain  SE SE0000412371 
MOLS-LINIEN  Travel & Tourism  DK DK0060135465 
MONBERG & THORSEN 
'B'  Heavy Construction  DK DK0010224310 
MONS BANK  Banks  DK DK0060133841 
MQ HOLDING  Apparel Retailers  SE SE0003303460 
MSC KONSULT 'B'  Computer Services  SE SE0000395105 
MULTIQ 
INTERNATIONAL  Computer Hardware  SE SE0000353898 
MUNKSJO  Paper  FI FI4000048418 
MYCRONIC  Electronic Equipment  SE SE0000375115 
N1  Specialty Retailers  IS IS0000020584 
NCC 'B'  Heavy Construction  SE SE0000117970 
NEDERMAN HOLDING  Building Mat.& Fix.  SE SE0002000083 
NEO INDUSTRIAL 'B'  Electrical Equipment  FI FI0009800296 
NESTE OIL  Integrated Oil & Gas  FI FI0009013296 
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NET ENTERTAINMENT 
NE 'B'  Gambling  SE SE0005876943 
NET INSIGHT 'B'  Telecom. Equipment  SE SE0000366098 
NEUROSEARCH  Biotechnology  DK DK0010224666 
NEUROVIVE 
PHARMACEUTICAL  Biotechnology  SE SE0002575340 
NEW WAVE GROUP 'B'  Clothing & Accessory  SE SE0000426546 
NEWCAP HOLDING  Specialty Finance  DK DK0010212570 
NGEX RESOURCES  Gold Mining  CA CA65339B1004 
NIBE INDUSTRIER 'B'  Building Mat.& Fix.  SE SE0000390296 
NKT  Electrical Equipment  DK DK0010287663 
NNIT  Computer Services  DK DK0060580512 
NOBIA  Furnishings  SE SE0000949331 
NOKIA  Telecom. Equipment  FI FI0009000681 
NOKIAN RENKAAT  Tires  FI FI0009005318 
NOLATO 'B'  Divers. Industrials  SE SE0000109811 
NORDEA BANK  Banks  SE SE0000427361 
NORDFYNS BANK  Banks  DK DK0010015072 
NORDIC MINES  Gold Mining  SE SE0001672809 
NORDIC 
SER.PTNS.HDG.'B'  Restaurants & Bars  SE SE0000476954 
NORDIC SHIPHOLDING  Oil Equip. & Services  DK DK0060083996 
NORDICOM  Real Estate Hold, Dev  DK DK0010158500 
NORDJYSKE BANK  Banks  DK DK0060034353 
NORDNET 'B'  Investment Services  SE SE0000371296 
NORTH MEDIA  Publishing  DK DK0010270347 
NOTE  Electronic Equipment  SE SE0001161654 
NOVESTRA  Specialty Finance  SE SE0005392529 
NOVO NORDISK 'B'  Pharmaceuticals  DK DK0060534915 
NOVOTEK 'B'  Software  SE SE0000567752 
NOVOZYMES  Biotechnology  DK DK0060336014 
NP3 FASTIGHETER  Real Estate Hold, Dev  SE SE0006342333 
NTR HOLDING  Electronic Equipment  DK DK0010027671 
NUNAMINERALS  General Mining  DK DK0060492577 
NURMINEN LOGISTICS  Transport Services  FI FI0009900187 
NYHERJI  Computer Services  IS IS0000000396 
OASMIA 
PHARMACEUTICAL  Pharmaceuticals  SE SE0000722365 
ODD MOLLY INTL.  Clothing & Accessory  SE SE0002017657 
OEM INTERNATIONAL 
'B'  Electrical Equipment  SE SE0005876968 
OKMETIC  Semiconductors  FI FI0009009054 
OLVI 'A'  Brewers  FI FI0009900401 
ONXEO  Pharmaceuticals  FR FR0010095596 
OPCON  Auto Parts  SE SE0000426652 
OPUS GROUP  Electronic Equipment  SE SE0001696683 
ORAVA RESIDENTIAL 
REAL ESTATE  Residential REITs  FI FI4000068614 
ORESUND INVESTMENT  Specialty Finance  SE SE0000115610 
OREXO  Pharmaceuticals  SE SE0000736415 
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ORIFLAME COSMETICS 
SDR  Personal Products  LU SE0001174889 
ORIOLA-KD 'B'  Medical Supplies  FI FI0009014351 
ORION 'B'  Pharmaceuticals  FI FI0009014377 
ORTIVUS 'B'  Medical Supplies  SE SE0000123085 
OSCAR PROPERTIES  Real Estate Hold, Dev  SE SE0005095601 
OSSUR  Medical Equipment  IS IS0000000040 
OUTOKUMPU 'A'  Iron & Steel  FI FI0009002422 
OUTOTEC  Industrial Machinery  FI FI0009014575 
PA RESOURCES 'B'  Exploration & Prod.  SE SE0005126729 
PANDORA  Clothing & Accessory  DK DK0060252690 
PANOSTAJA  Specialty Finance  FI FI0009800379 
PARKEN SPORT & 
ENTM.  Recreational Services  DK DK0010237643 
PARTNERTECH  Electronic Equipment  SE SE0000394165 
PEAB 'B'  Heavy Construction  SE SE0000106205 
PER AARSLEFF  Heavy Construction  DK DK0010243450 
PKC GROUP  Electrical Equipment  FI FI0009006381 
PLATZER FASTIGHETER  Real Estate Hold, Dev  SE SE0004977692 
POHJOIS-KARJALAN KRJ.  Publishing  FI FI0009900468 
PONSSE  Comm. Vehicles,Trucks  FI FI0009005078 
POOLIA 'B'  Bus.Train & Employmnt  SE SE0000567539 
POYRY  Business Support Svs.  FI FI0009006696 
PRECISE BIOMETRICS  Electronic Equipment  SE SE0001823303 
PREVAS 'B'  Computer Services  SE SE0000356008 
PRICER 'B'  Electronic Equipment  SE SE0000233934 
PRIME OFFICE  Real Estate Hold, Dev  DK DK0060137594 
PROACT IT GROUP  Computer Services  SE SE0000412991 
PROBI  Biotechnology  SE SE0001280355 
PROFFICE 'B'  Bus.Train & Employmnt  SE SE0000470700 
PROFILGRUPPEN 'B'  Aluminum  SE SE0000393860 
QLIRO GROUP  Broadline Retailers  SE SE0003652163 
QPR SOFTWARE  Software  FI FI0009008668 
RAISIO  Food Products  FI FI0009002943 
RAMIRENT  Comm. Vehicles,Trucks  FI FI0009007066 
RAPALA VMC  Recreational Products  FI FI0009007355 
RATOS 'B'  Specialty Finance  SE SE0000111940 
RAUTE 'A'  Industrial Machinery  FI FI0009004741 
RAYSEARCH LABS.'B'  Medical Equipment  SE SE0000135485 
RECIPHARM AB  Pharmaceuticals  SE SE0005757267 
REGINN HF  Real Estate Hold, Dev  IS IS0000021301 
REITIR HF  Real Estate Hold, Dev  IS IS0000020352 
REJLERS B  Business Support Svs.  SE SE0000123671 
RELLA HOLDING  Specialty Finance  DK DK0016033889 
RESTAMAX  Restaurants & Bars  FI FI4000064332 
REVENIO GROUP  Medical Equipment  FI FI0009010912 
REZIDOR HOTEL 
GROUP  Hotels  SE SE0001857533 
RIAS 'B'  Industrial Machinery  DK DK0010125848 
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RINGKJOBING 
LANDBOBANK  Banks  DK DK0060032068 
RNB RETAIL AND 
BRANDS  Apparel Retailers  SE SE0005223674 
ROBLON 'B'  Electrical Equipment  DK DK0060485019 
ROCKWOOL 'B'  Building Mat.& Fix.  DK DK0010219153 
ROTTNEROS  Paper  SE SE0000112252 
ROYAL UNIBREW  Brewers  DK DK0060634707 
RTX  Telecom. Equipment  DK DK0010267129 
SAAB 'B'  Aerospace  SE SE0000112385 
SAGA FURS  Clothing & Accessory  FI FI0009800551 
SAGAX 'B'  Real Estate Hold, Dev  SE SE0005127818 
SALLING BANK  Banks  DK DK0010017367 
SAMPO 'A'  Prop. & Casualty Ins.  FI FI0009003305 
SANDVIK  Industrial Machinery  SE SE0000667891 
SANISTAL 'B'  Specialty Retailers  DK DK0010245661 
SANOMA  Publishing  FI FI0009007694 
SANTA FE GROUP  Business Support Svs.  DK DK0010006329 
SAS  Airlines  SE SE0003366871 
SCANDI STANDARD  Food Products  SE SE0005999760 
SCANDINAVIAN BRAKE 
SYS.  Auto Parts  DK DK0060042612 
SCANFIL  Electrical Equipment  FI FI4000029905 
AKTKT.SCHOUW & CO.  Divers. Industrials  DK DK0010253921 
SEAMLESS 
DISTRIBUTION  Software  SE SE0000857369 
SECTRA 'B'  Medical Equipment  SE SE0006168530 
SECURITAS 'B'  Business Support Svs.  SE SE0000163594 
SEMAFO  Gold Mining  CA CA8169221089 
SEMCON  Business Support Svs.  SE SE0000379497 
SENSYS TRAFFIC  Electronic Equipment  SE SE0000567729 
SHELTON PETROLEUM  Exploration & Prod.  SE SE0000514572 
SIEVI CAPITAL  Specialty Finance  FI FI0009008924 
SIF FODBOLD 'B'  Recreational Services  DK DK0010128008 
SIMCORP  Software  DK DK0060495240 
SINTERCAST  Industrial Machinery  SE SE0000950982 
SJOVA  Full Line Insurance  IS IS0000024602 
SKAKO  Industrial Machinery  DK DK0010231877 
SEB 'C'  Banks  SE SE0000120784 
SKANSKA 'B'  Heavy Construction  SE SE0000113250 
SKF 'A'  Industrial Machinery  SE SE0000108201 
SKF 'B'  Industrial Machinery  SE SE0000108227 
SKISTAR 'B'  Hotels  SE SE0000241614 
SKJERN BANK  Banks  DK DK0010295922 
SOFTRONIC 'B'  Computer Services  SE SE0000323305 
SOLAR 'B'  Electronic Equipment  DK DK0010274844 
SOLTEQ  Computer Services  FI FI0009007991 
SOPRANO  Computer Services  FI FI0009012793 
SOTKAMO SILVER  Plat.& Precious Metal  SE SE0001057910 
SP GROUP  Commodity Chemicals  DK DK0010244771 
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SPAR NORD BANK  Banks  DK DK0060036564 
SPONDA  Real Estate Hold, Dev  FI FI0009006829 
SRV YHTIOT  Heavy Construction  FI FI0009015309 
SSAB 'B'  Iron & Steel  SE SE0000120669 
ROVSING  Business Support Svs.  DK DK0060400398 
SSH COMMUNICATIONS  Software  FI FI0009008270 
SUOMEN STJN.KIT.  Real Estate Hold, Dev  FI FI0009900559 
STOCKMANN 'B'  Broadline Retailers  FI FI0009000251 
STOCKWIK 
FORVALTNING  Telecom. Equipment  SE SE0001159344 
STORA ENSO 'R'  Paper  FI FI0009005961 
STRATEGIC INVS.  Specialty Finance  DK DK0010271238 
STUDSVIK  Divers. Industrials  SE SE0000653230 
SMARTGUY GROUP  Apparel Retailers  DK DK0060046522 
SUOMINEN  Nondur.Household Prod  FI FI0009010862 
SVEDBERGS I DALSTORP 
'B'  Building Mat.& Fix.  SE SE0000407991 
SCA 'B'  Personal Products  SE SE0000112724 
SVENSKA HANDBKN.'B'  Banks  SE SE0000152084 
SWECO 'B'  Heavy Construction  SE SE0000489098 
SWEDBANK 'A'  Banks  SE SE0000242455 
SWEDISH MATCH  Tobacco  SE SE0000310336 
SWEDISH ORPHAN 
BIOVITRUM  Pharmaceuticals  SE SE0000872095 
SWEDOL 'B'  Specialty Retailers  SE SE0001733841 
SYDBANK  Banks  DK DK0010311471 
SYSTEMAIR  Building Mat.& Fix.  SE SE0002133975 
TAKOMA  Business Support Svs.  FI FI0009901110 
TALENTUM  Publishing  FI FI0009900898 
TALVIVAARA MNG.CO.  Nonferrous Metals  FI FI0009014716 
TDC  Fixed Line Telecom.  DK DK0060228559 
TECHNOPOLIS  Real Estate Hold, Dev  FI FI0009006886 
TECNOTREE  Computer Services  FI FI0009010227 
TELE2 'B'  Mobile Telecom.  SE SE0005190238 
TELESTE  Telecom. Equipment  FI FI0009007728 
TELIASONERA  Mobile Telecom.  SE SE0000667925 
TETHYS OIL  Exploration & Prod.  SE SE0001176298 
THULE GROUP  Recreational Products  SE SE0006422390 
TIETO OYJ  Computer Services  FI FI0009000277 
TIKKURILA  Building Mat.& Fix.  FI FI4000008719 
TIVOLI 'B'  Recreational Services  DK DK0010040500 
TK DEVELOPMENT  Real Estate Hold, Dev  DK DK0010258995 
TOBII AB  Computer Hardware  SE SE0002591420 
TOPDANMARK  Prop. & Casualty Ins.  DK DK0060477503 
TOPSIL SEMICON.MATS.  Semiconductors  DK DK0010271584 
TORM  Marine Transportation  DK DK0060082915 
TOTALBANKEN  Banks  DK DK0060082758 
TRACTION 'B'  Specialty Finance  SE SE0000391716 
TRADEDOUBLER  Media Agencies  SE SE0001552357 
TRAINERS HOUSE  Computer Services  FI FI0009008122 
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TRANSCOM WW  Business Support Svs.  SE SE0006168316 
TRANSMODE  Telecom. Equipment  SE SE0001471103 
TRELLEBORG 'B'  Industrial Machinery  SE SE0000114837 
TRIBONA  Real Estate Hold, Dev  SE SE0005126885 
TRIGON AGRI  Farm Fish Plantation  SE DK0060083566 
TROAX GROUP  Iron & Steel  SE SE0006732392 
TRYGGINGAMIDSTODI
N HF  Prop. & Casualty Ins.  IS IS0000000586 
TRYG  Full Line Insurance  DK DK0060013274 
TULIKIVI 'A'  Building Mat.& Fix.  FI FI0009900583 
UNIBET GROUP SDB  Gambling  SE SE0001835588 
UNIFLEX 'B'  Bus.Train & Employmnt  SE SE0001283607 
UNITED INTL.ENTS.  Farm Fish Plantation  DK BSP951331318 
UPM-KYMMENE  Paper  FI FI0009005987 
UPONOR  Building Mat.& Fix.  FI FI0009002158 
VAAHTO GROUP 'A'  Internet  FI FI0009900708 
VAISALA 'A'  Electronic Equipment  FI FI0009900682 
VALMET  Industrial Machinery  FI FI4000074984 
VATRYGGINGFELAG 
ISLANDS  Prop. & Casualty Ins.  IS IS0000007078 
VBG GROUP  Auto Parts  SE SE0000115107 
VELOXIS 
PHARMACEUTICALS  Biotechnology  DK DK0060048148 
VENUE RETAIL GROUP 
'B'  Specialty Retailers  SE SE0000396822 
VESTAS WINDSYSTEMS  Renewable Energy Eq.  DK DK0010268606 
VESTJYSK BANK  Banks  DK DK0010304500 
VIBORG HANDBOLD 
KLUB 'B'  Recreational Services  DK DK0016017171 
VICTOR 
INTERNATIONAL  Real Estate Hold, Dev  DK DK0010022367 
VICTORIA PARK B  Real Estate Hold, Dev  SE SE0005932795 
VICTORIA PROPERTIES  Real Estate Hold, Dev  DK DK0015216675 
VIKING LINE  Travel & Tourism  FI FI0009005250 
VIKING SUPPLY SHIPS  Marine Transportation  SE SE0000143521 
VITEC SOFTWARE 
GROUP 'B'  Software  SE SE0000514630 
VITROLIFE  Biotechnology  SE SE0000816043 
VOLVO 'B'  Comm. Vehicles,Trucks  SE SE0000115446 
VOSTOK NAFTA 
INV.SDR  Specialty Finance  SE SE0005191475 
WALLENSTAM 'B'  Real Estate Services  SE SE0000115008 
WARTSILA  Industrial Machinery  FI FI0009003727 
WIHLBORGS 
FASTIGHETER  Real Estate Hold, Dev  SE SE0001413600 
WILLIAM DEMANT 
HLDG.  Medical Equipment  DK DK0010268440 
WULFF-GROUP  Industrial Suppliers  FI FI0009008452 
XANO INDUSTRI 'B'  Industrial Machinery  SE SE0000119224 
YIT  Heavy Construction  FI FI0009800643 
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YLEISELEKTRONIIKKA 
PREF.  Electronic Equipment  FI FI0009900724 
ZEALAND PHARMA  Biotechnology  DK DK0060257814 
 
